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To Be or Not to Be Exclusive: Statutory Construction of the
Charging Order in the Single Member LLC
Thomas Earl Geu,
Thomas E. Rutledge and
John W. DeBruyn*
'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful
tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean -
neither more nor less.'
'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words
mean so many different things.'
'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is
to be master - that's all.'
-Lewis Carroll,
Through the Looking Glass1
INTRODUCTION
The charging order, long a feature of the law of partnerships and
other unincorporated entities, has, in the context of the single-mem-
ber LLC, generated significant controversy. 2 Recently, the Florida
* Geu is professor of law at the South Dakota School of Law in Vermillion, South Dakota.
Rutledge is a member of Stoll Keenon Ogden PLLC resident in its Louisville, Kentucky office.
DeBruyn is principal of DeBruyn Law Office in Denver, Colorado, where he practices with his
son. All three authors are frequent commentators on the law of unincorporated business organi-
zations. They thank T. Leigh Anenson, Associate Professor University of Maryland Robert H.
Smith School of Business and of counsel, Reminger Co., L.P.A., for her orientation and assis-
tance concerning the topic of equity, and Norma A. Lockhart for her patience in typing the
manuscript and deciphering the authors' various questionable handwritten notes. Of course, any
errors are those of the authors alone.
1. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LoOKING-GLAsS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 132
(Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. 1893) (1871).
2. The charging order is the remedy of a judgment-creditor against the interest in an unincor-
porated entity (e.g., membership) owned by its debtor. See infra notes 9-37 and accompanying
text. In the context of the single member LLC it has generated significant controversy. For
example, upon the bankruptcy of the sole member of an LLC, does the right to manage the LLC
transfer to the bankruptcy estate? In In re Albright, 291 B.R. 538 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003) and In
re Ehmann, 334 B.R. 437 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005), withdrawn 337 B.R. 228 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2006),
the courts answered "yes." See generally Thomas E. Rutledge & Thomas E. Geu, The Albright
Decision - Why a SMLLC is Not an Appropriate Asset Protection Vehicle, 5 Bus. ENTITIES,
Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 16; Thomas E. Rutledge & Thomas E. Geu, Guess Who's Coming to Dinner?:
The Bankruptcy Trustee's Ability to Become a Member and the Ehmann Decision, 7 Bus. ENI-
TIES No. 2, Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 32; Thomas E. Rutledge & Thomas E. Geu, In re Ehmann I -
Now You See It, Now You Don't, 8 Bus. ENTITIES No. 3, May-June 2006, at 44.
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Supreme Court waded into this quagmire in deciding Olmstead v. Fed-
eral Trade Commission.3 Sadly, rather than mapping the issues to
help future travelers, Olmstead charted a unique and difficult course
for others to follow.
This article first analyzes the Olmstead facts and describes the
charging order remedy in the context of the single-member LLC. As
a matter of policy it suggests that there exist reasons beyond in per-
sonam delectus for applying charging order provisions in toto to single-
member LLCs. It then critically examines the Court's method of stat-
utory construction against the backdrop of real constitutional separa-
tion of power issues. Finally, the article discusses the role of equity in
the contexts of separation of power and charging order statutes. It
suggests an equitable alternative to reach the same right result in
Olmstead. The article concludes with the warning that even the po-
tentially best legislative "fixes" to Olmstead are probably doomed to
be either over-inclusive or under-inclusive.
THE OLMSTEAD FACTS
The defendants, Shaun Olmstead and others, operated an "ad-
vance-fee credit card scam."' 4 In order to fund restitution obligations
that exceeded $10 million, the defendants' assets were placed in re-
ceivership; those assets included membership interests in several sin-
gle-member limited liability companies ("SMLLCs") organized under
Florida law. Further, the trial court directed the defendants to en-
dorse and surrender to the receiver all "right, title and interest" in
each SMLLC.5 The defendants asserted the order went too far be-
cause the only remedy against their SMLLC interests was under the
Florida LLC Act's charging order provision.6 The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals certified the following question to the Florida Su-
preme Court:
Whether, pursuant to [the charging order provision of the Florida
LLC Act], a court may order a judgment-debtor to surrender all
"right, title and interest" in the debtor's ... [SMLLC] to satisfy an
outstanding judgment. 7
In the course of its opinion the Florida Supreme Court rephrased -
and expanded - the question as follows:
3. 44 So. 3d 76 (Fla. 2010).
4. FTC v. Olmstead, 528 F.3d 1310, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2008).
5. Olmstead, 44 So. 3d at 77.
6. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.433(4) (West 2010).
7. Olmstead, 528 F.3d at 1314.
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Whether Florida law permits a court to order a judgment debtor to
surrender all right, title and interest in the debtor's... [SMLLC] to
satisfy an outstanding judgment.8
In turn, the Court answered Yes to the rephrased question. The
narrowest interpretation of the holding was that the absence of the
word "exclusive" in the LLC Act's charging order provision means
that other collection remedies may be asserted against the member's
interests in the SMLLC. More troubling, however, was that the
Court, in justification of its narrow holding, engaged in a (flawed) nor-
mative analysis about the place of the charging order in the context of
a Florida LLC.
THE CHARGING ORDER GENERALLY
The charging order exists to balance two valid and competing inter-
ests: (1) those of the judgment-creditor to collect on a judgment
against an owner; and (2) the interest of the venture to use its assets to
its operations and obligations without interference from an owner's
creditor.9 Corporate law contemplates the transfer of voting rights
with its underlying ownership shares. Even pure voting rights can be
transferred in corporations through a rather detailed statutory proxy
mechanism. In unincorporated law, however, the interests of an
owner are divided into a "transferable interest," encompassing the ec-
onomic rights of ownership, and management rights.10 Under the
statutory default rules the transferable interest is freely transferable to
a third-party, 1 fully vesting in the transferee the right to receive all
8. Olmstead, 44 So. 3d at 77.
9. A significant failure of the Olmstead court was its assumption that the charging order exists
to support the rule of in delectus personae (pick your partner) otherwise embodied in partner-
ship and LLC law. In fact, the basis of the charging order is asset segregation, the rule that
company assets will be applied to the satisfaction of venture obligations rather than the personal
obligations of the owner. See infra notes 57-66 and accompanying text ("The Unfortunate Nor-
mative Discussion of the Charging Order Generally"). Thomas E. Rutledge, I May Be Lost But
I'm Making Great Time: The Failure of Olmstead to Correctly Recognize the Sine Qua Non of the
Charging Order, 13 J. PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES, Nov.-Dec. 2010, at 49.
10. Collectively a partner's "interest in the partnership," or "partnership interest." UNIF.
P'SHiP Acr 1997 § 101(9), 6(1) U.L.A. 61 (2001). See also UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP Acr § 701, 6A
U.L.A. 461 (2008). In the context of the LLC the formulae vary, with some statutes defining a
"transferable interest" (see, e.g., REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACr § 102(21), 6B U.L.A. 430
(2008); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(8) (2010); see also IND. CODE § 23-18-1-10 (2010) (de-
fining the term "interest" as the right to receive distributions from the LLC with no term defin-
ing the management participatory rights). Other states define a "limited liability company
interest" encompassing economic and management rights (see, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 275.015(12) (West 2010)) with distinctions then drawn as to the transferability (or not) of the
two components. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.255 (West 2010).
11. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT 1914 § 27, 6(11) U.L.A. 332 (2001); UNIF. P'SHIP ACT 1997 § 503(a)(1),
6(l) U.L.A. 156 (2001); UNIF. LTD. P'sHrP § 702(a)(1), 6A U.L.A. 461 (2008); UNIF. LTD. LIAB.
20101
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distributions (periodic and liquidation) that would have otherwise
been received by the transferor. 12 The management rights, however,
are not unilaterally transferable. 13 Even a transferee of those man-
agement rights may not exercise them' 4 absent the consent of some
portion of the incumbent members.' 5
Starting from the proposition that the rights of the creditor in the
debtor's property can be no greater than the rights enjoyed by the
Co. § 502(a)(1), 6B U.L.A. 496 (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-503(a)(1) (2010); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 275. 255(1)(a) (2010), § 362.1-503(l)(a), § 362.2-702(1)(a); and IND. CODE § 23-18-
6-3.1(b)(1) (West 2010).
12. UNIF. P'SHiP Acr 1914 § 27(1), 6(11) U.L.A.332 (2001); UNIF. P'sHP AcT 1997
§ 503(b)(1), 6(I) U.L.A. 157 (2001); UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP AcT § 702(b), 6A U.L.A. 462 (2008);
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. AcT § 502(b), 6B U.L.A. 496 (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 15-503(a)(1) (2010); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 275.255(1)(b) (2010), § 362.1-503(2)(a), (b),
§ 362.2-702(2); and IND. CODE § 23-18-6-3.1(b)(2) (West 2010).
13. Conversely, in corporate law, absent private ordering to the contrary, shares are freely
transferable, and the transferee may exercise all rights of the transferor, including the right to
vote. The exception to this statement is Nevada, which as to "closely held" corporations utilizes
a charging order. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.746 (2010); see also Thomas E. Rutledge, Nevada's
Corporate Charging Order: Less There Than Meets the Eye, 11 J. PASSTHROUGH ETrriEs, Mar.-
Apr. 2008, at 21; Thomas E. Rutledge, The Nevada Restricted LLC/LP: Damned If You Do and
Damned If You Do, 12 J. PASSTHROUGH ErNrTIES, Mar.-Apr. 2010, at 48.
14. UN F. P'sHIP AcT 1914 § 27(1), 6(11) U.L.A. 332 (2001); UNIF. P'srIp AcT 1997
§ 503(a)(3), 6(I) U.L.A. 156-57 (2001); UNiF. LTD. P'stP Acr § 702(a)(3), 6A U.L.A. 462
(2008); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. Acr § 502(3), 6B U.L.A. 496 (2008); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 15-503(a)(3) (2010); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275. 255(1)(c) (2010), § 362.1-501(1)(c),
§ 362.2-702(1)(c); and IND. CODE § 23-18-6-3.1(b)(3) (West 2010).
15. See, e.g., UNIF. P'SHIP ACr 1914 § 18(g), 6(11) U.L.A. 101 (2001) (stating transferee to be
admitted as a partner only upon the approval of all incumbent partners); UNIF. P'sriP AcT 1997
§ 401(i), 6(I) U.L.A. 133 (2001) (same); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 404(c)(7), 60 U.L.A. 591
(2008) (stating transferee to be admitted as a member only upon the approval of all of the
incumbent members); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. Acr § 401(d)(3), 6B U.L.A. 478 (2008)
(stating transferee to be admitted as a member only upon the approval of all of the incumbent
members); UNIF. LTD. P'SHrP AcT § 301(3), 6A U.L.A. 416 (2008), § 401(4), 6A U.L.A. 428
(stating transferee to be admitted as a partner only upon the approval of all of the incumbent
partners); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-704(a)(1) (2010) (stating transferee to be admitted as a
member only upon the approval of all of the incumbent members), § 18-702(b)(3) (stating trans-
feree to be admitted as a member only upon the approval of all of the incumbent members),
§ 15-401(i) (stating transferee to be admitted as a partner only upon the approval of all of the
incumbent partners); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 48-7A-401(i) (2010) (stating transferee may become
partner only with the consent of all partners), § 47-34A-503 (stating transferee admitted as mem-
ber only upon consent of all incumbent members); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.265(1) (2010)
(stating transferee to be admitted as a member upon the approval of majority-in-interest of the
incumbent members), § 362.1-401(9) (stating transferee to be admitted as a partner only upon
the approval of all of the incumbent partners), § 362.2-301(3) (stating transferee to be admitted
as a limited partner only upon the approval of all of the incumbent partners); and IND. CODE
§ 23-18-6-4.1(b) (West 2010) (stating transferee admitted as a member only upon the approval of
all other members). See generally Thomas E. Rutledge, Assigning Membership Interests: Conse-
quences to the Assignor and Assignee, 12 J. PASSTHROUGH ENTrrIES, July-Aug. 2009, at 35, 35
(2009).
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debtor, 16 it follows that the creditor of a member or partner may look
only to the transferable economic rights in the venture as an asset
available to satisfy a debt. 17 A judgment-creditor gains access to the
distributions made with respect to the judgment-debtor's transferable
interest by means of a charging order. The holder of the charging
order has a lien on the distributions when made by the partnership or
LLC to the judgment-debtor,18 but does not enjoy any right to partici-
pate in the venture's management.1 9 This limitation on participation
in management precludes the judgment-creditor from forcing an in-
terim or liquidating distribution from the partnership or LLC.20 From
the other side of the equation, the judgment-debtor remains an owner,
and her management rights are not diminished. 21 The charging order
does not transfer the partner or member's transferable interest to the
judgment-creditor, 22 and the right to participate in management stays
16. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr 1914 § 25, 6(11) U.L.A. 294 (2001), cmt. to subdivision (2-c) ("The
beneficial rights of the separate creditors of a partner in partnership property should be no
greater than the beneficial rights of their debtor."); see also James R. Richardson, Creditors'
Rights and the Partnership, 40 Ky. L.J. 243, 245 (1952) ("A stream can rise no higher than its
source; a creditor can acquire no greater interest than his debtor.").
17. See also 1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 7:8 (2d ed. 2010) ("Just as LLC members cannot individually
assign the firm's specific property, it follows that they cannot make it individually available to
their creditors in connection with individual debts.") [hereinafter RiBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON
LLCs]. The same statement is made in the official comment to section 705 of the Prototype LLC
Act. See PROTOTYPE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AcT, § 705, Commentary.
18. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT 1997 § 504(b), 6(I) U.L.A. 160 (2001); UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 703(b),
6A U.L.A. 463 (2008); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. Acr § 503(a), 6B U.L.A. 498 (2008); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.260(3) (2010), § 362.1-504(3), § 362.2-703(3); UNIF. STATUTORY TRUST
ENTITY Acr § 606(c), 6B U.L.A. (2010 Supp.) 84; UNIV. LTD. Coop. Ass'N AcT § 605(a), 6A
U.L.A. 233 (2008). In contrast, certain statutes do not expressly describe those rights as being a
lien. See, e.g., IND. CODE. § 23-18-6-7 (West 2010).
19. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.260(2) (West 2010) ("To the extent so charged, the
judgment creditor has only the rights of an assignee and shall have no right to participate in the
management or to cause the dissolution of the [LLC].").
20. Asset partitioning is maintained. See, e.g., UNIF. P'SHIP Acr 1914 § 25(2)(a), 6(11) U.L.A.
294 (2001) (partner may utilize partnership property only for partnership purposes), § 25(c)
(partnership property not subject to attachment to satisfy partner's personal debt).
21. See HILLMAN, VESTAL & WEIDNER, THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr (2010-
11), REVISED UNIF. P'SHrP ACT § 503, Authors' Comment 8; J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN
SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE (2010) § 7:20. By way of analogy, a mortgage
does not transfer to the lender title to the collateral under the lien theory of mortgages in prop-
erty law and under most "sale of asset" provisions in entity law statutes.
22. UNIV. P'SHIP ACT 1997 § 504(b), 6(1) U.L.A. 160 (2001); UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 703, 6A
U.L.A. 463 (2008). Certain state formulas are quite express on the point. See, e.g., Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 275.260(3) (West 2010) ("A charging order does not of itself constitute an assign-
ment of the [LLC] interest."), § 362.1-504(4), and § 362.2-703(3). See also Thomas E. Rutledge,
The 2007 Amendments to the Kentucky Business Entity Statutes, 97 KY. L.J. 229, 252-53 (2008-
09).
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with the member. 23 When the underlying judgment is satisfied, the
charging order is released and the owner again receives distributions.
Upon foreclosure the owner is either expelled or is subject to being
expelled from the venture. 24 The purchaser at the foreclosure sale has
the rights of a transferee of a transferable interest. To repeat for em-
phasis, transferable rights are passive in nature; all that is sold or pur-
chased at the sale are the passive economic rights that the judgment-
debtor could otherwise unilaterally convey. The purchaser is a trans-
feree/assignee and has the right to receive whatever distributions the
transferor/assignor would receive but for the transfer or assignment.25
23. UNIF. P'SHIP Acr 1997 § 502, 6(I) U.L.A. 156 (2001) ("The only transferable interest of a
partner in the partnership is the partner's share of the profits and losses of the partnership and
the partner's right to receive distributions. The interest is personal property."). See also UNIF.
LTD. P'SHIP Acr § 701, 6A U.L.A. 461 (2008) ("The only interest of a partner which is transfera-
ble is the partner's transferable interest. A transferable interest is personal property."); RE-
VISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. Acr § 102(21), 6B U.L.A. 430 (2008) (defining a "transferable
interest" as "the right, as originally associated with a person's capacity as a member, to receive
distributions from [an LLC] in accordance with the operating agreement, whether or not the
person remains a member or continues to own any part of the right."). See also UNIF. P'SHIP
Acr 1997 § 101(9), 6(I) U.P.A. 61 (2001) ("'Partnership interests' or 'Partner's interest in the
partnership' means all of the partner's interests in the partnership, including the partner's trans-
ferrable interest and all management and other rights."); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-101(15)
(2010) (substituting "economic interest" for "transferable interest"), § 18-101(8) (defining a "lia-
bility company interest" as "[a] member's share of the profits and losses of [an LLC] and a
member's right to receive distributions of the [LLC]'s assets."). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 14-
11-101(13) (West 2010) (defining a "limited liability company interest" as referring to only the
economic interest in the company); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1002 (West 2010) (defining a "mem-
bership interest" as referring to only the economic interest in the company); IND. CODE. § 23-18-
1-10 (2010) (defining an "interest" in terms of the economic rights of a member).
24. Compare UNrF. P'SHIP Act 1997 § 601(4)(ii), 6(I) U.L.A. 163 (2001); UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP
Acr § 601(b)(4)(B), 6A U.L.A. 450 (2008) (stating upon transfer of all economic interests in the
venture the partner is automatically expelled from status as a partner), with Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 275.280(1)(c)2 (West 2010) (stating upon the transfer of all of a member's economic
rights in a venture, the member may be expelled by a vote of a majority-in-interests of the other
members). See also Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.255(1)(d) (West 2010).
25. See, e.g., REVISED UNF. LTD. LIAB. Co. Acr § 502(b), 6B U.L.A. 496 (2008) ("A trans-
feree has the right to receive, in accordance with the transfer, distributions to which the trans-
feror would otherwise be entitled."); UNiF. LTD. P'SHIP Acr § 702(b), 6A U.L.A. 462 (2008) ("A
transferee has a right to receive, in accordance with the transfer: (1) Distributions to which the
transferor would otherwise be entitled; and (2) Upon the dissolution and winding up of the
limited partnership's activities, the net amount otherwise distributable to the transferor."); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.255(1)(b) (West 2010) ("An assignment shall entitle the assignee to re-
ceive, to the extent assigned, only the distributions to which the assignor would be entitled.");
and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702(b)(2) (2010) ("An assignment of [an LLC] interest entitles
the assignee to share in such profits and losses, to receive such distribution or distributions, and
to receive such allocation of income, gain, loss, deduction or credit or similar item to which the
assignor was entitled, to the extent assigned."). UNIF. P'SmtP Acr 1997 § 503(b), 6(I) U.P.A. 157
(2001), provides:
A transferee of a partner's transferable interest in the partnership has a right:
(1) To receive, in accordance with the transfer, distributions to which the transferor
would otherwise be entitled;
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The rights of a transferee are very limited when compared to those of
a member. Unlike members, who typically hold management rights,
an assignee or transferee under most statutes do not have inspection
rights or other related information rights, 26 nor a right to participate
in management 27 even with respect to modification of the underlying
operating agreement when the modifications have a negative effect on
the assignee. 28 Finally, the assignee or transferee is typically owed
neither fiduciary obligations nor obligations of good faith or fair
dealing. 29
THE CHARGING ORDER FORMULAE
The various state statutes use different formulae for the charging
order,30 typically including:
(2) To receive upon the dissolution and winding up of a partnership business, in accor-
dance with the transfer, the net amount otherwise distributable to the transferor; and
(3) To seek under Section 801(6) a judicial determination that it is equitable to wind up
the partnership business.
In certain instances, an assignee/transferee has limited rights to move for judicial dissolution and
receive an accounting at, or after, the dissolution of the business organization. See, e.g., UNIF.
P'SHIP AcT 1997 §§ 503(b)(3), 801(6), 6(I) U.L.A. 156, 189 (2001).
26. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. Acr § 410(g), 6B U.L.A. 494 (2008).
27. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. AcT § 502(a)(3), 6B U.L.A. 496 (2008) (stating
the assignee of an LLC interest is not entitled to "participate in the management or conduct of
the activities of the [LLC] or to have access to its records and other information."); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 275.255(1)(c) (West 2010) (providing in part "An assignment of [an LLC] interest
shall not.., entitle the assignee to participate in the management and affairs of the [LLC] or to
become or exercise any rights of a member other than the right to receive distributions pursuant
to subsection (1)(b) of this section."); UNrF. P'SHIP AcT 1997 § 503(a)(3), 6(I) U.L.A. 156 (2001)
(stating a transferee, during the "continuance of the partnership," is not entitled to "participate
in the management or conduct of the partnership business, to acquire access to information
concerning partnership transactions, or to inspect or copy the partnership books or records.").
28. See, e.g., Bauer v. The Blomfield Co., 849 P.2d 1365 (Alaska 1993) (stating assignee of
partnership interest not owed obligations of good faith and fair dealing); Bayside Petroleum, Inc.
v. Whitmar Exploration Co., 1997 WL 34690262 (D. Okla. 1997) (stating "no fiduciary duty" is
owed the assignee of a partner); Haynes v. B&B Realty Group, LLC, 633 S.E.2d 691 (N.C. 2006)
(stating no fiduciary duties owed to transferee of LLC interest); Landskroner v. Landskroner,
797 N.E.2d 1002, 1014 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (stating fiduciary duties are not owed to former
member of LLC).
29. See Thomas E. Rutledge, Carter G. Bishop & Thomas Earl Geu, No Cause for Alarm:
Foreclosure and Dissolution Rights of a Member's Creditor, 21 PROBATE & PROPERTY, May-June
2007, at 35, 40.
30. See infra Exhibit 1 for a side-by-side comparison of the charging order provisions of UPA,
RULPA, RUPA, ULPA, ULLCA, RULLCA and USTA. Professor Carter Bishop has published
'and from time to time updates' a state-by-state comparison of the charging order provisions of
the various LLC Acts. See Carter G. Bishop, Fifty State Series: LLC Charging Order Statutes
(Suffolk Univ. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 10-03), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1542244.
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* an express statutory statement identifying the rights of the or-
der's holder vis-A-vis the partnership/LLC;31
* the exclusivity of the charging-order remedy for the judgment-
creditor of the judgment-debtor partner/member; 32
" the availability of foreclosure to the holder of a charging order
against the underlying transferable interest;33
* the standard for foreclosure; 34 and
* the rights of the purchaser at the foreclosure sale.35
The existence of different statutory provisions across state borders
creates choice of law (and related) questions. 36
31. Compare REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 703, 6A U.L.A. 463 (2008) (stating holder of
charging order has rights of assignee), with REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 504, 6B U.L.A.
605 (2008) (silent as to holder's rights).
32. Compare UNIF. P'SHIP ACT 1914 § 28, 6(11) U.L.A. 341 (2001) (making no statement as to
exclusivity), with UNIF. P'SHIP ACT 1997 § 504(e), 6(I) U.L.A. 160 (2001) (stating charging order
is exclusive remedy).
33. Compare REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 503(c), 6B U.L.A. 498 (2008) (providing
for foreclosure), with UNIF. STATUTORY TRUST ENTrrv ACT § 606, 6B U.L.A. 84 (Supp. 2010)
(silent as to foreclosure) and IND. CODE § 23-18-6-7 (West 2010) (silent as to foreclosure).
34. Compare UNIF. P'SHIP ACT 1914 § 28, 6(11) U.L.A. 341 (2001) (silent as to a standard for
while permitting foreclosure), with REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. AT § 503(c), 6B U.L.A. 498
(2008) (setting standard for foreclosure).
35. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 503(c), 6B U.L.A. 498 (2008); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 275.260(4) (2010), § 362.1-504(4).
36. This raises issues concerning the scope of the "internal affairs" doctrine and conflict of
laws or "choice of law" issues. That is: (1) Is the charging order provision a matter of internal
affairs such that the law of the state of formation controls its application? and/or (2) How will a
court of a forum state, e.g., one in which a tort was committed, frame the conflict of laws or
"choice of law" issue? See also Carter G. Bishop, LLC Charging Orders: A Jurisdictional and
Governing Law Quagmire, 12 J. Bus. ENTITIES, May-June 2010, at 14.
The first issue is simply whether charging orders so affect the rights of third parties as to be
excluded from the internal affairs doctrine. Note this issue even arises when there is a statutory
choice of law provision because it addresses the scope of internal affairs, not choice of law (di-
rectly). Background for both issues is given by the Restatement (Second) on Conflict of Laws
provides:
[W]hen there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable
rule of law include (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the
relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the
protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field
of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determi-
nation and application of the law to be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971).
In corporate law, most, but not all, courts apply the law of the state of formation for purposes
of piercing the corporate veil of limited liability. See J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A.
SULLIVAN, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 11.3 (2010); Thomas E. Rutledge, To Boldly Go Where You Have Not Been Told You May Go:
LLCs, LLPs and LLLPs in Interstate Transactions, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 206 (2006); cf. Matt
Stevens, Note, Internal Affairs Doctrine: California versus Delaware in a Fight for the Right to
Regulate Foreign Corporations, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1047 (2007). The case for applying the law of
formation for the liability of members via piercing, of course, presents slightly different policy
issues than does the charging order. It would seem, however, that the status of the ultimate
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As discussed in the next part of this article, the absence of exclusiv-
ity language in the Florida LLC Act's charging order provision was
the door for the Olmstead decision.37
THE ANALYTIC QUAGMIRE OF THE CHARGING ORDER IN THE
CONTEXT OF A SMLLC
The charging order arose in the context of the general partnership
and partnerships require at least two partners. 38 It developed as a
means of protecting both the partnership as an entity and the individ-
ual partner(s) whose interests were not charged from interference by
a partner's personal judgment-creditor. A second order implication of
the charging order (as well as the restriction upon foreclosure of a
purchaser to the rights of an assignee) is that it protects the in delectus
recipient of the interest would be an internal affair. Therefore, for example, the purchaser at a
foreclosure sale of an interest has the status of a transferee and not a member. See supra note
23. Professor Ribstein recently wrote that the internal affairs doctrine was a corporate doctrine
that did not originally extend to unincorporated entities and further that its extension to unin-
corporated entities was a key reason for the "vigorous competition" among states in unincorpo-
rated entity innovation and law. Larry E. Ribstein, The Uncorporation's Domain, 55 VILL. L.
REV. 125, 132 (2010) (stating it is a choice of law rule).
There are other related issues, for example jurisdiction. The case of Koh v. Inno Holdings
Ltd., 54 P.3d 1270 (2002), is a jurisdictional case concerning collection from a judgment debtor
that was a member of an LLC. In that case, the LLC was formed under the Washington LLC
Act. The judgment-debtor was a Singapore public corporation. The creditor held a judgment
issued by a California court and filed a charging order in Washington because the LLC had a
presence and property there. The Washington court held that the charging order was valid
against the LLC even though it had no personal jurisdiction over the judgment-debtor whose
membership interest was personal property.
Finally, a simple illustration of the concepts mentioned in this note as applying to fraudulent
conveyance laws to domestic trusts follows:
An argument that the full faith and credit clause does not affect the ability of domestic
asset protections trusts to protect assets contends that the trustee is not the same per-
son as the settlor, and that therefore a judgment obtained against the settlor would not
be enforceable against the trustee. However, if a judgment were obtained against a
settlor in Florida who had created an Alaska trust and the claimant was unable to
collect that judgment, he or she would bring a post-judgment fraudulent transfer action
and join the trustee in Alaska as a transferee (as any transferee would be joined over
whom jurisdiction could be obtained). Once that joinder is accomplished, the Florida
court would have jurisdiction over that trustee, and an order issued by the Florida court
determining that the transfer into the trust was a fraudulent transfer, would, as a result
of the full faith and credit clause, be enforceable in Alaska.
Portfolio 810-2nd: Asset Protection Planning, BNA ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS PORTFOLIOS:
ESTATE PLANNING/BUSINESS PLANNING § VI (2010).
37. One of us (Rutledge) has criticized the absence of exclusivity language in the charging
order provision of the Uniform Statutory Trust Entity Act. See Thomas E. Rutledge & Ellisa 0.
Habbart, The Uniform Statutory Trust Entity Act. A Review, 65 Bus. LAW. 1055, n.244 and ac-
companying text (2010).
38. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr 1914 § 6(1), 6(11) U.L.A. 393 (2001); see also Urn'. P'SHnP Acr 1997
§ 101(6), 6(I) U.P.A. 61 (2001).
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personae rule embodied in the law of unincorporated business organi-
zations.39 However, that is not its primary focus. Rather, the charging
order serves to protect the asset partitioning effect of holding assets
in, and doing business through, a business venture. Even as both com-
mon law and the Uniform Partnership Act significantly embodied the
39. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also Rutledge, supra note 9. Partnership
law, of course, existed before the express adoption of charging orders. An 1889 partnership
treatise, however, identifies the elemental attributes of partners (as opposed to partnership at-
tributes) as turning on title and the relationship of the partnership to its property. See JAMES
PARSONS, AN EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF PARTNERSHIP § 53, p. 131, § 55, p. 138, § 110,
p. 366 (1889). Those attributes are consistent with both the emergence and operation of the
charging order.
Piecing together those attributes in the treatise results in the following description of the rights
of one holding a charging order. It starts with the entity-aggregate distinction and may be reflect-
ing the opinion of the treatise author given his protestations, the treatise states: "It is not neces-
sary to declare land to be personalty in order to subject it to firm business. All that is necessary
is to apply to land the principles which govern the partnership relation." Id. at § 110, p. 366
(There is a distinction in results between a partner holding legal title in partnership real estate in
his own name who conveys legal title to his individual creditor and a partner who conveys per-
sonalty (his interest in the partnership as an entity) to his individual creditor: the first takes
against the partnership, the second does not. Id. at 369). Importantly the land is converted in
equity (or subject to the doctrine of equitable lien, see id. at 360): "The legal holder is merely
converted into a trustee for the partnership." Id. at 367. Finally, no partner can withdraw his
share from the firm or prevent the firm's use of the land until settlement." PARSONS, § 110, p.
367 (footnote omitted).
The treatise defines profits in relationship to the rights of partnership creditors (firm creditors)
as follows: (1) "Profits result from the use of the contribution."; (2) "[P]rofits have no indepen-
dent status, but are merged in the contribution."; (3) "The word 'profits' is a relative term, and
has a meaning only for the partners themselves."; (4) "The creditor may demand all property, or
assets, of his debtor-firm, because they are devoted to the payment of his claim."; (5) "The co-
called [sic] right [of a partner] to share the profits during the partnership is not a right at all, but
a threat. It takes effect as a condition.., to sever the relation altogether..."; and, here is where
it gets interesting; (6) "Should the partners divide the joint fund among themselves, and convert
the joint into several titles, the withdrawal would be a fraud upon the creditor [b]ut the ...
[partners] would not be charged because they took it ... as profits [rather, because that they
withdrew it before the creditor was repaid his loan]." Id. at 132, 138-140.
Thus, the treatise is of the view that the partners have either an equitable lien or equitable title
in "partnership" real estate; and, there is no transferable "profits" interest because any positive
cash flow increases the original contributions of the partners but, by definition, is not profit until
all the partnership creditors are paid in final settlement after dissolution. Any interim distribu-
tion, therefore, could be a fraudulent conveyance subject to clawback under that equitable doc-
trine as long as firm creditors exist.
If the summary is correct, the law circa 1889 did not anticipate regular interim distributions
and, arguably, assumed the accounting period for determining profit was the life of the partner-
ship. As a result, distributions or withdrawals to or by partners were subject to fraudulent con-
veyance law. Of course, this is logical and complete under general partnership law, because the
partners have unlimited liability for partnership debts and obligations. That is, the partners
would be liable to the partnership creditors for distributions if the partnership was not able to
pay them. As a general matter, therefore, there would be no need for resort to fraudulent con-
veyance law. Though not explicit in the treatise, it seems that any of the withdrawal paid to a
partner's individual creditor would be subject to a constructive trust or an equitable lien for the
benefit of the partnership creditor to the extent it could be traced.
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"aggregate" (as contrasted with the "entity") notion of the partner-
ship, 40 they provided for asset partitioning. Even as the partnership's
property was co-owned by the partners as a "tenancy in partnership,"
partners could not use partnership property for anything other than
partnership purposes and were expressly precluded from using it for
personal purposes. 41 A partner using partnership property for per-
sonal gain would be in violation of their duty of loyalty.42 Under the
common law, prior to the development of the charging order:
When a creditor obtained a judgment against one partner and he
wanted to obtain the benefit of that judgment against the share of
that partner in the firm, the first thing was to issue a ft. fa., and the
sheriff went down to the partnership place of business, seized every-
thing, stopped the business, drove the solvent partners wild, and
caused the execution creditor to bring an action in Chancery in or-
der to get an injunction to take an account and pay over that which
was due by the executor debtor. A more clumsy method of pro-
ceeding could hardly have grown up.43
The reasons for this state of affairs were two-fold.44 First, lawyers
and courts had "difficulty ... in understanding the nature of a part-
40. The question of aggregate versus entity treatment of partnership under UPA was explored
in a series of articles, which included William Draper Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24
YALE L.J. 617 (1915); Judson A. Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Criticism, 28 HARV. L.
REV. 762 (1915); William Draper Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. Crane's
Criticism, Part I & Part II, 29 HARV. L. REV. 158, 291 (1915-1916); Judson A. Crane, The Uni-
form Partnership Act and Legal Persons, 29 HARV. L. REV. 838 (1916); Samuel Williston, The
Uniform Partnership Act, with Some Remarks on Other Commercial Laws, 63 U. PA. L. REV. 196
(1914); Joseph H. Drake, Partnership Entity and Tenancy in Partnership: The Struggle for a Defi-
nition, 15 MICH. L. REV. 609 (1917). See also EDWARD H. WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES
WITHOUT INCORPORATION 293-301 (Baker Voorhis 1929) (discussing various utilizations of en-
tity and aggregate concepts in UPA, concluding that "Drafting the Uniform Partnership Act
afforded a wonderful opportunity to give a clear and ambiguous answer to that question. We
think that no such answer is given by the Act, and that is a matter of profound regret.") For
more recent reviews of the issue, see Gary S. Rosin, Functionalizm in Partnership Law, 42 ARK.
L. REV. 395 (1989), and A. Ladru Jensen, Is a Partnership Under the Uniform Partnership Act an
Aggregate or an Entity?, 16 VAND. L. REV. 377 (1963).
41. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT 1914 § 25, 6(11) U.L.A. 294 (2001). See also ALAN R. BROMBERG &
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 3.04(b)(1) (2010) (UPA
§ 25(2) defined tenancy in partnership "so as to negate all of the incidents of individual owner-
ship .... Functionally, therefore, property is owned by the partnership."). Modem partnership
law has abandoned the notion of tenancy in partnership, providing rather that the partnership's
property will be held by it as an entity. See UNIF. P'sHp ACT 1997 § 203, 6(I) U.L.A. 96 (2001);
see also § 201(a), 6(l) U.L.A. 91 (2001).
42. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT 1914 § 21(1), 6(11) U.P.A. 194 (2001); see also Thomas E. Rutledge
& Thomas Earl Geu, The Analytic Protocol of the Duty of Loyalty Under the Prototype LLC
Act, 63 ARK. L. REV. 473 (2010).
43. J. Gordon Gose, The Charging Order Under the Uniform Partnership Act, 28 WASH. L.
REV. 1 (1953) (quoting Brown, Janson & Co. v. Hutchinson & Co., [1895] 1 Q.B. 737).
44. See also JUDSON A. CRANE & ALAN R. BROMBERG, THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 43, p.
241 (1968) [hereinafter CRANE & BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP].
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ner's interest in a partnership. '45 Second, "[t]he common law had no
procedure for the seizure of the partner's intangible interest in the
business. ' 46 The first reason still exists, although the modern statutes
have provided greater definitional clarity on this point.47 The second
reason suggests part of the solution to the charging order problem is
careful consideration of, and drafting for, the statutory nature of the
abstract rights of a member in her membership interest.
The SMLLC, however, creates significant challenges to the underly-
ing rationale for the charging order. Initially, and as other com-
mentors have well identified, 48 the rule of in delectus personae cannot
apply in the context of an SMLLC. Simply put, no "other members"
exist as "other members" is a null set.49 Second, and returning to the
sine qua non of the charging order, it is often difficult on both factual
and analytic grounds to distinguish the single member from the
SMLLC and, under those circumstances, to respect the asset-parti-
tioning element of the LLC structure.50
THE NARROW READING OF OLMSTEAD - STATUTORY EXCLUSIVITY
One reading of Olmstead is that as the Florida LLC Act does not
contain an express statement of exclusivity (i.e., preemption), it is dif-
ferent than the charging order provisions under other of Florida's
other unincorporated statutes. 51 Not having been defined as exclu-
sive, the Florida LLC's Act's charging order provision is in parity with
and supplements other available judgment-creditor statutes under
45. See supra note 39.
46. See supra note 39.
47. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP Acr § 201(a), 6 U.L.A. 91 (2001) (a partnership is a
legal entity); § 502, 6 U.L.A. 155 (2001) (a partnership interest is personal property); § 203, 6
U.L.A. 96 (2001) (partnership property is not the property of the partners individually); § 501, 6
U.L.A. 155 (2001) (a partner has no ownership interest in partnership property).
48. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Reverse Limited Liability and the Design of Business Organi-
zations, 30 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 199 (2005); Carter G. Bishop, Reverse Piercing: A Single Member
LLC Paradox, 54 S.D. L. REV. 199 (2009).
49. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.010(2) (West 2010) ("[An LLC] is a legal entity
distinct from its members"), § 275.240(1) ("Property transferred to or otherwise acquired by [an
LLC] shall be the property of the [LLC] and not of the members individually."), § 275.250 ("[An
LLC] interest shall be personal property."). See also Rutledge, supra note 9. It appears that
only Wyoming expressly references the SMLLC in its charging order provision. See Wyo. STAT.
§ 17-29-503(g) (2010) (charging order is the exclusive remedy of a member's judgment creditor,
including if they are the sole member).
51. The charging order provision of Florida's adoptions of both RUPA and ULPA state that
the charging order is the exclusive remedy of a partner's judgment creditor. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 620.8504 (West 2010) (F1RUPA); § 620.1703 (FlULPA).
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Florida law.52 Florida law provides a levy and execution remedy for
property that is assignable by the judgment-debtor.5 3 As a result of
Olmstead being the only member of the LLC, he had the practical
capacity to assign his interest, vesting in the assignee all membership
rights-including management. In Olmstead, there were no other
members whose consent was required in order for him to assign all
those rights.54 The Court held that Olmstead could be compelled to
52. See Olmstead v. FTC, 44 So. 3d 76, 80 (Fla. 2010) ("Since the charging order remedy
clearly does not authorize the transfer to a judgment creditor of all of an LLC member's "right,
title and interest" in an LLC, while section 56.061 clearly does authorize such a transfer, the
answer to the question at issue in this case turns on whether the charging order provision in
section 608.433(4) always displaces the remedy available under section 56.061.").
53. Olmstead, 44 So. 3d at 80. As a matter of background, but also of critical importance, the
Court in Olmstead found Florida's general statutory execution scheme would apply to members
of LLCs if the charging order was not the exclusive remedy for judgment creditors under the
LLC Act. The Court cites Section 56.061 Florida Statutes (2008). A critical determination was
that the LLC was to be treated as a corporation for purposes of that statute. Specifically, it said,
in part, "An LLC is a type of corporate entity ... ." Id. Shortly thereafter it added: "At no
point have the appellants contended that section 56.061 does not by its own terms extend to an
ownership interest [in an LLC] .... " Id. at 81. Had the LLC charging order provision been
interpreted as exclusive, it would have been consistent with the general execution statute; i.e.,
corporation means corporation and has one statutory provision and LLCs have another.
Two points are relevant for possible future reference. First, and as a general matter, "one of
the characteristics that all LLCs share is that they are "unincorporated .... " RIBsTEIN & KEAT-
INGE ON LLCs, supra note 17, at 1-11. Second, LLCs are flexible entities and not easily suscepti-
ble to a one size fits all analysis. Ribstein, supra note 36 (Ribstein used the term uncorporation
rather than unincorporated entities or alternative entities). As Professor Miller concluded:
Where the issue is one that is not explicitly addressed within the parameters of the LLC
statute, such as how an LLC or those associated with it are to be treated under another
statutory or regulatory scheme, the tendency of courts to examine how other entities
have been treated and to analogize to the LLC context is not surprising. Where a
statute does not expressly refer to LLCs, as in the case of a statute enacted prior to the
advent of LLCs, the question may arise whether other terminology used in the statute,
such as "person," "corporation," or "association," encompasses LLCs. Courts have
reached various conclusions in such cases. Some courts have readily accepted the anal-
ogy between an LLC and a corporation, at times even interpreting the word "corpora-
tion" to include an LLC. In a number of contexts, however, courts have emphasized
the unincorporated nature of an LLC and have concluded that an LLC is not the
equivalent of a corporation. In some cases, it is entirely appropriate to approach an
LLC as "like a corporation" or "like a partnership." Here again, however, courts
should be mindful (as they have been with respect to treatment of LLC interests under
federal securities laws) that some contexts call for refinement or variation of the princi-
ples and analyses applied to other entities if the theory and policy underlying the LLC
form, as well as the particular doctrine being applied to the LLC, are to be best
effectuated.
Elizabeth S. Miller, Are Courts Developing a Unique Theory of Limited Liability Companies or
Simply Borrowing From Other Forms, Symposium: Limited Liability Companies, 42 SUFFOLK U.
L. REv. 617, n.151 (2009); Thomas E. Geu, A Single Theory of Limited Liability Companies: An
Evolutionary Analysis; Symposium: Limited Liability Companies, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 507
(2009); see also Rutledge & Geu, supra note 42.
54. See Olmstead, 44 So. 3d at 81 ("The limitation on assignee rights in section 608.433(1) has
no application to the transfer of rights in a single-member LLC. In such an entity, the set of "all
96 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:83
make that alienation in satisfaction of the judgment against him be-
cause his membership rights were alienable entirely at his option and
in his discretion.
The implied burden on drafters to amend all acts as the state-of-the-
art in drafting moves forward in any of them implicit in the Court's
reliance upon the absence of exclusivity language in the Florida LLC
Act is subject to challenge. For example, it is curious that the Olin-
stead Court did not reference prior lower court rulings in Florida to
the effect that the charging order was the exclusive remedy of the
judgment-creditor and that other collection mechanisms were not
available.5 5 Further, it is a fair assumption that the drafters of the
Florida LLC Act were both aware of and intended to incorporate the
common law as it existed at the time of adoption. 56
Nonetheless, as previously mentioned, a reasoned analysis of the
opinion leads one to the conclusion that the holding is supported by a
sound technical and logical textual basis.
members other than the members assigning the interest" is empty. Accordingly, an assignee of
the membership interest of the sole member in a single-member LLC becomes a member and
takes the full right, title, and interest of the transferor without the consent of anyone other than
the transferor.").
55. See Givens v. Nat'l Loan Investors, L.P., 724 So. 2d 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (Florida
RULPA charging order is the exclusive remedy for the judgment-creditor of a limited partner);
Atlantic Mobile Homes, Inc. v. LeFever, 481 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (under Flor-
ida UPA, "the charging order is the only means by which a judgment creditor can reach the
debtor's partnership interest"); see also Myrick v. Second Nat'l Bank of Clearwater, 335 So. 2d
343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (under Florida UPA, a judgment creditor must being with a charg-
ing order before other collection mechanisms may be employed); and In re Stocks, 110 B.R. 65
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989) (citations omitted) (the Florida adoptions of UPA and RULPA have
modified the law as to levy and sale under execution to the effect that "the statutory charging
order [is] the only means by which a judgment creditor can legally command payment from the
debtor's partnership interest"). As a general statement of "hornbook" law circa 1968 about the
original UPA:
Although the U.P.A. nowhere says that a charging order is the exclusive process for a
partner's individual creditor, the courts have generally so interpreted it. This seems
consistent with the Act, but (since the charge is wholly post-judgment) may not harmo-
nize with the policy of allowing pre-judgment attachment in many states. Against a
limited partner's interest, the charging order is cumulative of other remedies which may
exist apart from the partnership Acts.
CRANE & BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP supra note 44, at § 43(b), p. 249 (footnotes omitted).
Note the distinction in treatment between truly passive liability shielded limited partner and the
general partner under UPA.
56. An article on Olmstead written by a Florida lawyer provides further background. Indeed,
it states that there was a previous attempt to amend the Florida LLC Act to include the exclusive
language, but that attempt was abandoned before introduction in the Florida legislature. Barry
A. Nelson, Olmstead, Right Result, Wrong Reason, 51 TAx MGMT. MEMO 315, 319 (2010).
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THE UNFORTUNATE NORMATIVE DISCUSSION OF THE CHARGING
ORDER GENERALLY
The most unfortunate aspect of the Olmstead decision is the Court's
normative linkage of the charging order remedy and the in delectus
personae rule concerning the admission of new or substitute mem-
ber[s]. Further compounding the Court's initial error of misidentify-
ing the most important reason for the charging order,57 the Court
engaged in a normative analysis of how that-incorrect-basis should
affect the statutory charging order remedy. The Court set forth an
analytic framework in which the justification for the charging order is
protection of the "pick your partner rule. '58 Having defined that-in
fact false-dependency, the Court was able to determine that in the
absence of a member other than the judgment-debtor the charging
order lacks purpose and justification. 59 At this point in the opinion
the case was already resolved as a matter of statutory construction;
therefore, all of this analysis is likely dicta, but it is worth recognizing
that the Court could have, and arguably should have, taken a slightly
different tack and adopted a theory of charging orders that protect the
in delectus personae rule even in the SMLLC context except to the
extent that either law, equity, or the operating agreement of the LLC
in question provides otherwise. Doing so, however, would, have
weakened the Court's conclusion of non-exclusivity.
Linkage to the in delectus personae of a second member is not theo-
retically necessary.60 While the principle of in delectus personae and
the procedure of charging orders have long existed in concert with one
another in multiple-member unincorporated organizations like part-
nerships, the charging order is not necessarily dependent upon that
principle for its justification and vitality. In fact, the charging order
serves to protect the venture itself, the venture's creditors, and the
participants in the venture (including the judgment-debtor), from a
judgment-creditor that is attempting to appropriate venture property
57. A similar misidentification of in personam delectus as the basis for the charging order took
place in the Albright decision. See In re Albright, 291 B.R. 538, 541 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003). See
generally Rutledge, supra note 9.
58. See generally Rutledge, supra note 9.
59. Drafters of statutes in response to Olmstead should be aware of a related unsolved ques-
tion under many states' LLC law, namely whether a person must have an "equity" (transferable)
interest in the LLC to be a member. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.195(3) (West 2010)
(permitting the admission of a member who does not acquire a limited liability company inter-
est); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-301(d) (2010) (same).
60. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text and the charging order certainly furthers and
protects that right. It does, however, raise other interesting issues beyond the scope of this
article. See generally CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 21.
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in satisfaction of an owner's judgment-debt. 61 Irrespective of whether
it is an SMLLC, the LLC has a legally justifiable right to apply its
property62 to its operations. 63 This principle is the second side of the
limited liability coin called asset partitioning; the assets of the business
organization are dedicated to its purposes and are not generally avail-
able to satisfy the creditors of the individual owners.64 This second
side of limited liability exists for the benefit of the business organiza-
tion's creditors and assists them in credit pricing, because absent distri-
butions (which may be limited by contract or covenant),65 company
assets will be applied first to their creditor claims and will not be di-
verted to satisfy the creditors of individual owners (members, part-
ners). The only counterbalance to this extremely protective rule is the
"reverse pierce" wherein, only under certain compelling circum-
stances, the assets of the entity are made available to meet the per-
sonal debts of an owner.66
A FALSE CATEGORY - THERE ARE No OTHER MEMBERS
The Olmstead decision's normative justification for not restricting
Olmstead's judgment-creditor to the charging-order remedy was
based upon the fact that there are no other members affected by the
transfer of Olmstead's interest in the SMLLC to the judgment-debtor.
While that is the case, it should not be the entirety of the analysis.
Rather, there may have been third parties with legitimate claims to be
considered.
Assuming that an SMLLC, while holding significant assets in its
own name, serves as the general partner of a number of real estate
developments; each development is organized as a limited partner-
ship. The sole member of the SMLLC is an experienced and accom-
61. See Gose, supra note 43; CRANE & BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP, supra note 44.
62. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.425(1) (2010) ("All property originally contributed to the
[LLC] or subsequently acquired by [an LLC] by purchase or otherwise is [LLC] property."); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 275.240(1) (West 2010) ("Property transferred to or otherwise acquired by a
[LLC] shall be the property of the [LLC] and not of the members individually.").
63. See also infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
64. See generally Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 253
(2005); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
YALE L.J. 387 (2000).
65. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.225(1)(c) (West 2010).
66. See, e.g., C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight P'ship, 580 S.E.2d 806, 810 (Va. 2003) (holding that
reverse piercing is possible under Virginia law and listing similar determinations of other juris-
dictions). See also Gregory S. Crespi, The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate Stan-
dards, 16 J. CORP. L. 33 (1991) (efforts to provide bulletproof asset protection may be frustrated
through "reverse piercing," especially if the asset transfer to the entity occurs after the judgment
is secured and if the entity is a single-member LLC). See, e.g., Litchfield Asset Mgmt. Corp. v.
Howell, 799 A.2d 298 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
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plished development manager. Furthermore, assume a judgment lien
against the SMLLC's only member consequent to his unfortunate per-
sonal decision to guarantee a cousin's corporate business debt.
Should a remedy beyond the charging order be permissible under
these circumstances (including the lack of personal culpability) 67 given
the possible significant negative consequences to the various real es-
tate developments that would follow from a change in ownership of
the SMLLC? 68 There is thus illuminated the fallacy of the in per-
sonam delectus rule as the basis for the charging order and the failure
of the "no other member" reasoning in the Olmstead case even
though the asset partitioning effect of the SMLLC is highlighted.
THE DISSENT
Two justices in the Olmstead case filed a significant dissent. At its
core, the dissent challenges the majority opinion's reliance on the ab-
sence of exclusivity language in the Florida LLC Act's charging order
provision.69 The dissent argues the majority rewrote the charging or-
67. Contrast Olmstead's personal and ongoing operation of a financial scam. See FTC v. Olm-
stead, 528 F.3d 1310, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2008).
68. A 1976 California case illustrates this logic and rationale in the related context of a limited
partnership that owned and operated a hotel. The individual judgment debtors were the only
limited partners and owned all of the stock in the corporate general partner. The personal judg-
ment debt was for defaulting on the purchase price of the stock in the corporate general partner.
The judgment debtor attempted to execute on the hotel owned by the limited partnership
through California's general levy and execution statute asserting the charging order process was
not appropriate because the judgment debtors owned all interests of the limited partnership and
its corporate general (analogous to the sole member of an SMLLC except for cross-consent
requirements for accepting new partners). The Court's discussion and analysis are instructive:
Plaintiff would have us adopt an exception to this statutory prohibition against exe-
cution (§§ 15028, 15522) to cover those cases in which the partnership is owned entirely
by the judgment debtors. He argues that the purpose underlying the enactment of
these statutes is to protect innocent partners from the injustice and hardship they may
suffer when partnership property is sold in execution of a judgment against an individ-
ual partner. (Taylor v. S & M Lamp Co., 12 Cal. Rptr. 323, (1961)). This purpose, so
the argument goes, is not furthered by disallowing execution against specific partner-
ship assets in cases when the judgment debtors won the entire proprietary interest in
the business.
We decline plaintiffs invitation to recognize such an implied exception to the re-
quired use of the statutory charge procedure. Where, as in the instant case, the part-
nership is a viable business organization and plaintiff does not show that he will be
unable to secure satisfaction of his judgment by use of a charging order or by levy of
execution against the debtor's other personally owned property, there is no reason to
permit deviation from the prescribed statutory process.
Evans v. Galardi, 546 P.2d 313, 321 (Cal. 1976). See also CRANE & BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP
supra note 44, at § 43.
69. Olmstead v. FTC, 44 So. 3d 76, 83 (Fla. 2010) (Lewis, J., dissenting). Curiously, the dis-
sent did not address the numerous earlier Florida decisions stating the charging order to be
exclusive even though not expressly set forth in the statute. See supra note 55.
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der law not only for SMLLCs, but for all LLCs.70 The dissent's
counter-argument suffers, however, from its suggestion that the ma-
jority's holding opens the door to creditor intervention in the context
of multiple-member LLCs.
In the context of a multiple member LLC, it would not be the case
that a judgment-creditor would acquire all rights and title in the judg-
ment-debtor's LLC interest and thereby be able to involve themselves
in the management and affairs of the LLC. Rather, the judgment-
creditor would hold either a charging order or, consequent to a fore-
closure sale, a transferable interest after a foreclosure under the under
state law, neither of which will afford the holder affirmative rights to
participate in company management. 71 Prior to foreclosure, there is
no mechanism to become a member; however, after acquisition by
foreclosure, the judgment-creditor may become a member but only
upon the consent of the incumbent members. Without that consent,
the creditor becomes only a transferee and does not succeed to the
right to participate in the LLCs management. 72 Thus, only under
unique circumstances consequent to private ordering in the LLC's
controlling operating agreement would the judgment-creditor of an
individual member in a multi-member LLC have more than the (mini-
mal) rights of an assignee or transferee. 73
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Moving from point A to point B on the surface of the statute using
tools of construction does not account for the jurisprudential ridges
and tangled policy wrecks that lurk just below. A general awareness
of these features aids in understanding Olmstead though, paradoxi-
cally, it does not explain it. The subsurface features are a result of
tension between law and equity on one side of the coin, and the sepa-
ration of powers between the judiciary and the legislative branches of
government on the other side of the coin. These tensions can quickly
devolve into a theoretical morass that are beyond the scope of this
70. Olmstead, 44 So. 3d 76, 83 (Fla. 2010) (Lewis, J., dissenting) (citing Thomas E. Rutledge &
Thomas E. Geu, The Albright Decision - Why a SMLLC is Not an Appropriate Asset Protection
Vehicle, 5 Bus. ENTiTiEs, Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 16).
71. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
72. Olmstead, 44 So. 3d 76, 79 (citing FL. STAT. § 608.432 (2010)); accord Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 275.275(1)(b), 275.265(1) (2010) (requiring a majority-in-interest of the members other
than the assignee to approve the admission of the assignee as a replacement member). See also
supra note 15.
73. For example, an operating agreement could provide that a member's transferee is admit-
ted to full membership in the LCC upon receipt of notice of the transfer.
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article. Nonetheless, an awareness these hard issues are integral to a
nuanced understanding of Olmstead.
The tensions, and the related issues analysis those tensions uncover,
are sometimes nested in statutory construction. Therefore, this article
provides a selective and illustrative introduction to the application of
canons of statutory construction and the use of equity as a part of
those canons. This is by no means a comprehensive or deep analysis.
Nonetheless, the issues that are uncovered but not resolved are pre-
sent just beneath the surface of many judicial opinions, including
Olmstead.
Karl Llewellyn took on the task of illuminating statutory construc-
tion in an article published in 1950. 74 Apparently, Llewellyn did not
hold to the convention that a statute had a single meaning since the
article clearly stated: "[t]he accepted convention still, unhappily re-
quires discussion as if only one single correct meaning could exist.
Hence there are two opposing canons [of statutory construction] on
almost every point .... Every lawyer must be familiar with them all:
they are still needed tools of argument.175 How does one choose the
correct canon to apply? Llewellyn posits that the judge should select
the canon that leads to a construction in harmony with the "good
sense" of the situation and use as simple a construction as possible
given that "good sense." In Llewellyn's own words:
Plainly, to make any canon take hold in a particular instance, the
construction contended for must be sold, essentially by means other
than the use of the canon: The good sense of the situation and a
simple construction of the available language to achieve that sense,
by tenable means, out of the statutory language."76
Llewellyn's "situational sense" that drives his recommended choice
of canons probably places him in the "cooperative partner" (prag-
matic) school of statutory construction. In the cooperative partner
school of statutory construction, judges are partners with the legisla-
ture "in the enterprise of law elaboration. '77 An opposing school of
construction places the judge in the role of a "faithful agent" of the
legislature 78 (sometimes referred to as the "textualist" or "formalist" 79
74. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1949-50).
75. Id. at 401.
76. Id. (emphasis in original).
77. William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power"
in Statutory Interpretation 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 991 (2001).
78. Id. at 993. Statutory construction is not the same as philosophy of law but may reflect it.
The faithful servant view of construction has much in common with the legal philosophy of Posi-
tivism. Positivism "became dominant in the nineteenth century as a rejection of natural law
philosophy." Maureen E. Markey, Natural Law, Positive Law, and Conflicting Social Norms in
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school). Moreover, Llewellyn's "situational sense" applies to broad
types of situations rather than to narrow types of situations which ap-
ply "the sense of a particular controversy between particular
litigants."80
It is unclear with which type of situational sense, if any, the Olin-
stead court approached its task. The "type of situation" approach fa-
vored by Llewellyn would frame the issue in terms of "all SMLLCs,"
"all LLCs" or even "all nonfraudulent LLCs." In the alternative, the
"controversy between particular litigants" approach would consider
the particular unique facts of the case: that the sole member of the
SMLLCs in question was engaged in a "scam" 81 and, furthermore,
that the LLCs apparently held the proceeds from those scams. These
analyses, of course, are never stated outright in the Olmstead opinion.
The fact that the court recites that the sole member of the LLCs was
involved in a "scam", however, seems to indicate that the court deter-
mined the "scam" to be important context for its decision. If so, Llew-
Harper Lee's To Kill A Mockingbird, 32 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 162, n.14 (2010). Under the Positiv-
ist conception of the philosophy of law: "Law does not derive from religious beliefs or absolute
moral values; rather, law is that which is promulgated by a legitimate authority and backed by
sanction for failure to comply." Id.
79. Eskridge, supra note 77, at 993. Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 71 (1993). For current examples of literature on the subject of equity,
more generally, seek the work of T. Leigh Anenson and, in turn, the literature she cites therein.
See, e.g., T. Leigh Anenson & Donald 0. Mayer, "Clean Hands" and the CEO: Equity as an
Antidote for Excessive Compensation, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 101 (2010); T. Leigh Anenson, Be-
yond Chafee: A Process-Based Theory of Unclean Hands, 47 AM. Bus. L.J. 509 (2010).
80. Llewellyn, supra note 74, at 398. In effect, Llewellyn classified his situational sense into
two categories and classification is an important and basic part of the law. Professor Weinrib
indicates just how important by stating: "[t]he understanding of law is a classificatory act. One
cannot claim to understand law if one cannot differentiate legal instances, that is, those events or
conditions to which the law assigns legal consequences, from all other events or conditions."
Jacob Weinrib, What Can Kant Teach Us About Legal Classification, (August 23, 2010), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1684344. Somewhat paradoxically, scholars like Professors Weinrib
and Waddams disagree about whether any classificatory scheme can yet explain the law. Stephen
Waddams, for example, takes the position, "that the complexity of the law exceeds the explana-
tory power of any classificatory system so far," in part, because classification schemes (or maps)
obscure the complexity of the instances in which it arises. Id. at 1-4. This helps explain in a
generalized theoretical way both the importance of classification and the reason it is difficult to
apply even relatively narrow statutory classification provisions, (like charging order statutes), to
real life situations.
Weinrib suggests that Waddams' bases his argument on history by "referring to a litany of
judges who emphasize the tension between the untidiness of law and the orderliness of classifica-
tion." Id. at 4. Illustratively:
Oliver Wendell Holmes claimed that "the life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience"; Lord Halsbury stated that "every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is
not always logical at all"; and Lord Wilberforce suggested that "[t]here are many situa-
tions of daily life that do not fit neatly into conceptual analysis."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
81. See supra note 4.
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ellyn's analysis would suggest the court was likely using a narrower
rather than a broader situational sense.
One of the dangers of using the narrower situational sense, accord-
ing to Llewellyn, is:
[I]t leads readily to finding an out for this case only-and that leads
to a complicating multiplicity of refinement and distinction, as to
repeated resort to analogies unthought through and unfortunate of
extension. This is what the proverb seeks to say "Hard cases make
bad law." 82
Alternatively, the Olmstead holding could be interpreted broadly to
apply to all single member LLCs, because the phrase "with respect to
a judgment debtor's freely alienable membership interest in a single-
member LLC ...." was expressly appended to its holding.83 The dis-
sent, conversely, argued that the majority's holding included all LLCs
in its situational sense, not just the single member LLCs situational
sense. The dissent argued that because the majority's reasoning
hinged on the absence of the word "exclusive" in the statute without
distinction, it would necessarily apply to single- and multi-member
LLCs alike.8 4
The extent of the holding is in question because the majority opin-
ion stated elsewhere:
The relevant question is not whether the purpose of the charging
order provision-i.e., to authorize a special remedy designed to
reach no further than the rights of nondebtor members of the LLC
will permit-provides a basis for implying an exception from the
operation of that provision for single member LLCs. Instead the
question is whether it is justified to infer that the LLC charging or-
der mechanism is an exclusive remedy.85
82. Llewellyn, supra note 74, at 398.
83. Olmstead v. FTC, 44 So. 3d 76, 82 (Fla. 2010).
84. Id. at 84.
85. Id. at 82. In 1998, a Florida appeals court interpreted the limited partnership charging
order provision (Florida's Act was a version of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act).
Like the LLC statute in Olmstead, the Florida limited partnership statute at the time did not
contain any provision for foreclosure of the lien portion of a charging order. Therefore, the
Court held there was no foreclosure sale procedure available under the limited partnership stat-
ute. Givens v. Nat'l Loan Investors L.P., 724 So. 2d 610 (Fl. App. Ct. 1998) (reh'g denied). On
one hand, this approach seems consistent with the interpretive approach taken in Olmstead,
because it emphasizes that the absence of a phrase or word has independent negative signifi-
cance. On the other hand, it can be seen as almost completely opposite to Olmstead, because in
Givens, the result of appellate court's holding was that a provision which looked like the LLC
provision was, in effect, exclusive because no other law was given effect to allow foreclosure
(e.g., execution sales); (though that was not an issue before the appellate court).
There is a possibility that the result in Givens was wrong, even assuming the interpretive ap-
proach (which was consistent with Olmstead) was appropriate. The court seemed a bit confused
by an edit of a portion of an article it quoted at length and upon which it partially relied (or by
which it was partially led astray). The edited and quoted part of the article can be interpreted to
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Recall that Llewellyn's broad situational sense framework seemed
consistent with the cooperative-partner school of statutory construc-
tion.86 Both the cooperative-partner and the faithful-agent schools of
construction argue from history. A proponent of the faithful-agent
school argues, for example, that the "cooperative-partner" approach
is simply an extension of "the old English tradition of equitable inter-
pretation. '87 Indeed, a treatise on statutory construction published in
1848 devotes an entire chapter to the use of equitable construction
after the separation of the legislative and judicial powers in England.88
This treatise bifurcated "equity" into two meanings.
The first meaning identifies equity as a source of law that is higher
than legislation or, in constitutional systems, even higher than the con-
stitution. It is "that natural justice which distributes right to all men
indiscriminately. '89 Thus, one rough meaning of "equity" is the "nat-
imply, and the Court clearly inferred, that a purchaser at the foreclosure sale under the general
partnership charging order provision somehow becomes a partner (perhaps confusing foreclo-
sure sales with execution sales, the latter of which correctly was not permitted by precedent).
86. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
87. Eskridge, supra note 77, at 993.
88. E. FITCH SMITH, SMITH'S COMMENTARIES ON STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 815 (1848) [hereinafter SMITH'S
COMMENTARIES].
89. "Natural Law" as a current source of judicial empowerment over legislation in a constitu-
tional sense is out of favor and swept up in the historical morass of "due process." By way of
summary, overview laws that "[do] not substantially impair a fundamental constitutional right,
or employ a constitutionally suspect classification ... enjoy a presumption of constitutionality."
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6th ed.) §11.5, p. 425 (2000).
See generally, ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLICY (2d ed.) §§ 8.1-8.2, pp.
584-605 (economic substantive due process). Under the rubric of substantive due process, very
few "fundamental rights" have been identified. In describing these fundamental rights, a treatise
states:
These are rights which the Court recognizes as having a value so essential to individual
liberty in our society that they justify the Justices reviewing the acts of other branches
of government in a manner quite similar to substantive due process approach of the
pre-1937 period. Little more can be said to accurately describe the nature of a funda-
mental right, because fundamental rights analysis is simply no more than the modem
recognition of the natural law concepts first espoused by Justice Chase in Calder v.
Bull.
NOWAK, supra, at § 11.7, p. 433 (footnote omitted). Of course, it is perhaps conceivable that a
charging order statute could run aground of federal constitutional provisions specifically based
on equal protection or procedural due process. Those topics are well beyond the scope of this
article. See T. Leigh Anerson, Process, supra note 79, at 533, n.91 (process jurisdiction).
State courts, on the other hand, "may have an advantage over federal courts in the scope of
their powers vis-a-vis the legislative branch." T. Leigh Anenson, Process, supra note 79, at 532
(footnote omitted). See also Lyman Johnson, Delaware's Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2011) (arguing that the Delaware General Assembly is constitutionally prohibited
from preventing its judiciary from applying fiduciary duties).
More generally, and constitutional issues aside, "natural law" "has been a centerpiece of legal
philosophy since the ancient Greeks and Romans[,]" and the "belief in universal principles of
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ural law" which is a source of inalienable rights either contained in, or
consistent with, the Constitution. These rights are an extra-constitu-
tional basis for judicial review. Judicial review on extra-constitutional
grounds, of course, raises separation-of-power issues between the leg-
islature and the judiciary. Natural law arguments, sometimes dis-
guised as an appeal to justice, are made even within the context of
charging orders and SMLLCs, in spite of the arrangements' flirtation
with the separation of power issue. These arguments are sometimes
embedded in the larger public-policy issues raised by asset-protection
planning.90 This rather raw, equitable version of construction, how-
right and wrong and the essential integration of law and morality are the central tenets of natural
law." Maureen E. Markey, supra note 78, at 163 (footnotes omitted but citing or naming Aris-
totle, Aquinas, Grotius, Rousseau, Locke, and Blackstone as adherents to one or another kind of
natural law hanging from being based in religion to being based [in] rational philosophy).
90. More than five years ago, a book on asset protection questioned the pedigree of public
policy concerning SMLLC charging orders as follows:
The original policy reason for the charging order, however, does not exist with a single-
member LLC. There is no other LLC member who would be unfairly affected by the
seizure of LLC assets or of the LLC interest itself in its entirety. [paragraph deleted] If
asset protection via the charging order is a major concern, single member LLCs should
be used with caution.
JAY D. ADKISSON & CHRISTOPHER M. RISER, ASSET PROTECTION: CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES
FOR PROTECTING YOUR WEALTH 219 (2004) (e.g., chapter 19 is entitled Charging Order Pro-
tected Entities). The book quoted sounds in both Llewellyn's situational sense of statutory con-
struction and the narrower meaning of equity (to the particular parties at bar). It says, in part,
"[v]ery simply, an asset protection structure that protects the assets of all persons, no matter how
illegal or despicable their conduct, cannot be expected to last long before changes in the law
defeat such structures." At the very least this complicates the drafting of charging order statutes
that seek both universality and certainty. ADKISSON, at 35. Note that the quote sounds prima-
rily in asset partition and this article argues that under most circumstances asset partition favors
use of a charging order provision to protect the business of the entity. See also supra notes 37-
50, 60-70, infra notes 179-183.
Jay Adkisson, one of the authors of the cited book, supra, further stated in an email to John
DeBruyn (one of the authors of this article):
American judges have never been nor were meant to be mere automatons who mind-
lessly apply statutes and interpret governing documents in a vacuum and without re-
gard to the surrounding circumstances. Indeed, it could be argued that the very role of
judges is to safeguard concepts of justice by not applying statutes in those situations
where it would be unfair or inequitable for the statutes to be applied, or to interpret
government documents in a way that would do an injustice. With this in mind, it is folly
to believe that one can draft statutes or create operating agreements that will provide
100% bulletproof asset protection in all situations for the benefit of all debtors against
all creditors. The judges can and will look for loopholes that lead to the most just result
in cases involving egregious facts; indeed, that is their job. The desire of some practi-
tioners to give complete comfort to their clients that their asset protection will stand up
in all circumstances against all comers will never be anything more than a false hope.
This is particularly true in the circumstance of the single member LLC, where if such an
entity were allowed to protect assets from the creditors of its single owner, it would
have the effect of creating an unlimited exemption for such of the personal property
that the single owner uses to fund the SMLLC in a way that would completely abrogate
the normal statutory exemptions from collection of such assets.
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ever, is only one of the tensions existing between law and equity that
can be raised in the context of statutory construction. 91 Another ten-
sion is related to the second meaning of equity.
The second meaning of equity for purposes of equitable construc-
tion is "justice which takes off from the rigor and severity of the writ-
ten law [(hereinafter equity softens the law)]."' 92 The same 1848
treatise quoted above posits that the practice of equitable construction
continues "in more modern times" 93 as an antidote to the universal
application of a statute in circumstances contrary to "the intention of
the law-giver, in matters which he was not able to or willing to ex-
press, or in restraining the words of the law, where it is clear that they
were not intended to extend to a particular act or thing. ' 94 This sec-
ond meaning of equity selectively softens the law in application, echo-
ing both of Llewellyn's situational senses in statutory construction.
Rather obviously, the difference between the two meanings of eq-
uity parsed by the old statutory-construction treatise is both of degree
and kind. It is a difference in degree because in the most powerful
natural-law sense, the judiciary can, and arguably should, override the
meaning, and even the intent, of the law if necessary, which in all cases
represents Llewellyn's broad interpretive sense. Under the other
meaning of equity, the court interpolates a meaning from the statute
that is "equitable" between the parties at bar in a given case, even
though the result may not be expressly provided by the statutory lan-
guage. In the latter instance, equity is used as a necessary antidote to
universal statements of law where it is clear the law-giver (legislature)
did not mean the law to extend to a particular circumstance or set of
circumstances. The use of equity as an antidote to law in individual
cases comes dangerously close to equity as between the two parties,
which violates Llewellyn's warning that the "narrower situational
sense" of construction raises both certainty and jurisprudential issues.
Llewellyn suggests that using this narrower sense can lead to "multi-
plicity of refinement and distinction." 95 In application, to repeat
E-mail from Jay Adkisson, to John DeBruyn (Aug. 26, 2010, 20:59 MST) (on file with author).
The old-fashioned notion of morality and its necessary role in the economy, as well as its place
in the evolution of humans and human societies, is the subject of serious study in the allied areas
of brain science including neuro-economics and behavioral and evolutionary economics. See,
e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Robert Kurzban & Owen D. Jones, The Origins of Shared Intuitions of
Justice, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1633 (2007). For a bibliography of other such literature, see http://law.
vanderbilt.edu/seal/ (last visited August 30, 2010).
91. See Eskridge, supra note 77, at 993.
92. SMITH'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 88, at 814.
93. SMITH'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 88, at 819.
94. SMITH'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 88, at 814.
95. Llewellyn, supra note 74, at 398.
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Llewellyn, it embodies the proverb: "Hard cases make bad law."'96 It
is inelegant. 97
In June 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided a case that
directly addressed the equitable powers of the federal courts in rela-
tion to the one-year statute of limitations on habeas corpus petitions. 98
The opinion, among other things, specifically discussed jurisdiction, 99
statutory construction,100 the role of equity in a statute of limitation
scheme, 10 1 and the importance of whether the statutory provision in
question originally sounded in equity or law.102 Each of these topics is
96. Id.
97. Elegant as used here means "neatness" and "simplicity." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COL-
LEGIATE DICrIONARY 402 (11th ed. 2003). It is used in the sense of Occam's razor. See id. at
816. Llewellyn suggests using the simplest construction to achieve the necessary sense of the law
is usually the right construction. See Llewellyn, supra note 74.
98. Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549 (2010).
99. Jurisdiction is a particularly confusing term when applied to equity. See infra note 134-60
and accompanying text. Its complexity, if not confusion, is also reflected in constitutional law.
For example, the Holland opinion stated:
First, the AEDPA "statute of limitations defense.., is not "jurisdictional." It does not
set forth "an inflexible rule requiring dismissal whenever" its "clock has run."... We
have previously made clear that a nonjurisdictional federal statute of limitations is nor-
mally subject to a "rebuttable presumption" in favor "of equitable tolling."
Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2560 (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 2561-62. The opinion discussed the majority's decision not to follow a linguistic
canon this way:
Hence, Congress had to explain how the limitations statute accounts for the time dur-
ing which such state proceedings are pending. This special need for an express provi-
sion undermines any temptation to invoke the interpretive maxim inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius (to include one item (i.e., suspension during state-court collateral re-
view) is to exclude other similar items (i.e., equitable tolling)).
Id. (citations omitted, emphasis in original).
Unlike the Olmstead opinion, however, the Supreme Court engaged in an extended discussion
about the purpose of the statute and its one-year statute of limitations. Compare Holland, 130
S.Ct. at 2562 (Breyer, J.), with Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2571 (Scalia, dissent). For the purpose of a
charging order (not discussed by Olmstead), see supra notes 9-29 and accompanying text.
101. First, there is a rebuttable presumption that equitable tolling is available against nonjuris-
dictional statute of limitation provisions. Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2560 (Breyer, J.). Second, the
court "will 'not construe a statute to displace courts' traditional equitable authority absent the
'clearest command' .... Id. The Court reiterated several factors that weighed in favor of
displacing equitable tolling under a different statute of limitations. Id. at 2561. These included
that "it set forth its time limitations in unusually emphatic form"; "used highly detailed and
technical language that, linguistically speaking cannot be read as containing implicit exceptions"
and; "related to an underlying subject matter, . . . with respect to which the practical conse-
quences of permitting tolling would have been substantial." Id. (internal quotation marks
removed).
102. See Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562 ("But AEDPA seeks to do so without undermining basic
habeas corpus principles and while seeking to harmonize the new statute with prior law, under
which a petition's timeliness was always determined under equitable principles."); id. at 2560
("In the case of the AEDPA, the presumption's strength is reinforced by the fact that equitable
principles have traditionally governed the substantive law of habeas corpus . (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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addressed in the context of Olmstead later in this article. 10 3 The im-
portance of the habeas petition here is that it illustrates the interplay
between the two meanings of equity.
First, concerning the softens the law equity type, the Court stated:
In emphasizing the need for flexibility for avoiding mechanical rules
... we have followed a tradition in which courts of equity have
sought to relieve hardships which from time to time, arise from a
hard and fast adherence to more absolute legal rules, which, if
strictly applied, threaten the evils of archaic rigidity.10 4
Second, although the Supreme Court does not directly address any
sort of natural law whatsoever, it hints at the "natural law" meaning of
equity when it observes that, in part, because the writ of habeas
corpus is the only writ mentioned by the Constitution, the Court
should "be hesitant" to find "a congressional intent to close court-
house doors that a strong equitable claim would normally keep
open."10 5 Thus, the importance of equity within constitutional and
common law jurisprudence is underscored by Holland; and, therefore,
equity's role in cases like Olmstead, even if inchoate and not concisely
recognized, it should not be underestimated going forward.
The Olmstead opinion seems to successfully navigate through the
disadvantages posed by both meanings of equity: (1) the natural law
meaning threatening separation of power; and (2) the equity softens
the law meaning suggesting that the judiciary has the power to ex-
pressly and selectively bend the law to fit the parties before it. It does
so by using a different kind of interpretation altogether, one that pur-
ports to focus on the actual language of the statute to find the intent
of the legislature as expressed in the statute. In Olmstead, the Court
determined that the intent is based on the absence of the word "exclu-
sive" or any other express statement of exclusivity.10 6
Thus, Olmstead uses the textualist approach to construction; and,
because the approach is ultimately based on legislative intent as ex-
pressed by the words of the statute alone, it would seem to posture
that the Court is in the faithful-agent school of statutory construction.
Textualists "maintain that the statutory text is the only reliable indica-
tion of ... intent," they use linguistic but not substantive canons of
construction. Linguistic canons include canons of construction like
103. See infra notes 134-60 and accompanying text (equitable jurisdiction); supra notes 88-102
and accompanying text (statutory construction); infra notes 104-12 and accompanying text (stat-
utory construction); infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text (role of equity in a statutory
scheme); infra notes 121-30 and accompanying text (effect of codifying former equity).
104. Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2563 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. Id. at 2562.
106. Olmstead v. FTC, 44 So. 3d 76, 81-82 (Fla. 2010).
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"'inclusion of the one is exclusion of the other.'"1107 As a general mat-
ter, "[l]inguistic canons pose no challenge to the principle of legisla-
tive supremacy because their very purpose is to decipher the
legislature's intent."'1 08 In contrast, the "cooperative partner" uses
other canons of construction, in addition to linguistic canons, "to ad-
just statutory language to protect public values."'10 9
As a result, the "safest" canons of construction for purposes of
avoiding separation-of-power issues inherent in equitable kinds of in-
terpretation are, almost by syllogism, linguistic canons. Linguistic ca-
nons, however, can be used to accomplish a substantive purpose. 110
Thus, linguistic canons can be used to obfuscate the actual use of
other approaches to construction; for example, Llewellyn's situational
sense. Guido Calabresi warns that linguistic construction can be used
"to hide a fundamental value conflict, recognition of which would be
too destructive for the particular society to accept[,]""' and he de-
scribes this type of construction as a "tragic choice. 11 2 These tragic
choices are inconsistent with both the faithful-servant and coopera-
tive-partner schools of interpretation.
The purpose of discussing advantages and pitfalls of various meth-
ods and approaches to statutory construction and selective rationale is
not meant to suggest the method or approach adopted by Olmstead
was inappropriate. Neither is the discussion meant to imply a nefari-
ous purpose for its use of linguistic canons within the textual ap-
proach. The purpose of the discussion, simply, is that courts have a
variety of tools to use to construct statutes. Therefore, different
courts may be expected to construct the same language under similar
factual circumstances differently. Moreover, it suggests that there are
jurisprudential and constitutional dimensions to issues of construction,
and it is possible to pick and choose tools of construction to avoid
those issues while reaching a desired result.
107. Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 109, 114,
117 (2010) ("[t]extualists 'tend to be originalists in constitutional interpretation' and emphasize
linguistic canons of construction.").
108. Id. at 117.
109. Id. at 116 (Barrett uses the modern term "dynamic statutory drafters" rather than Llew-
ellyn's "cooperative partners," but for purposes of this article they can be used synonymously.).
110. Id. at 119 ("[t]he distinction between linguistic and substantive canons is not always
crisp, for canons that ostensibly advance substantive values are sometimes rationalized as func-
tionally linguistic.").
111. GuiDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 172 (1982). This book,
though not necessarily the quote used in the text, has been called "[tihe most provocative chal-
lenge to originalism as a method of statutory construction" and "a radical solution." Nicholas S.
Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353, 357 (1989).
112. CALABRESI, supra note 111, at 173.
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MAXIMS: THE LAW-EQUITY BOUNDARY
The Olmstead Court charted its course based on linguistic canons of
construction which avoided the issues related to either the natural law
meaning or the equity softens the law meaning of equity. In doing so,
it necessarily, if not intuitively, acknowledged the existence of two
maxims that help demarcate the boundary between law and the equity
softens the law meaning of equity. 113 They are: (1) "Equity follows the
law, 11 4 and; (2) "Equity has no jurisdiction where there is an ade-
quate, complete, and certain, remedy at law [(hereinafter, adequate
remedy at law)]."' 115 These two maxims are related, but can be in con-
flict at the outer reaches of their respective applications.
The first maxim has a narrow scope because, according to ancient
hornbook law, "[t]he great mass of equity jurisprudence has been cre-
ated by open disregard of the [common] law."11' 6 Nonetheless, one of
the classes of cases to which the maxim applies, according to the same
old hornbook, is "[w]here legal rights are considered in a court of eq-
uity, the general rules and policy of the law must be obeyed. 1 7 Con-
versely, but not inconsistently, the United States Supreme Court has
said that a statute should not be construed to displace a court's "tradi-
tional equity authority absent the 'clearest command' or an 'ines-
capable inference' to the contrary."" 8
The relationship between statutory law and equity is relevant to
Olmstead because the original articulation of the charging order in
English courts was equitable (in chancery). 119 It is arguable, there-
fore, that codification of the charging order simply acknowledged and
recognized what was already being done by courts in equity; and, as a
result, that charging-order statutes were not intended to cabin the
113. Another treatise suggests the following regarding the use of maxims:
The maxims of equity are short statements of principles that guide courts of equity in
the exercise of their discretion. Their brevity and generality prevent them from having
much utility in determining how the court will act in a given situation, but they possess
some utility as memory aids, after the principles they represent have been mastered.
HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EouITY 52 (2d ed. 1948).
114. JAMES W. EATON, EATON ON Eourrv 42 (2d ed. 1923).
115. Id. at 28.
116. Id. at 42.
117. Id.
118. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 340 (2000) (emphasis added) (citing Califano v. Yamasaki,
442 U.S. 682, 705 (1979), Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946)). See the
discussion of Holland, supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
119. See Brown Janson & Co. v. A. Hutchinson & Co., [1895] Q.B. 737 (Eng. C.A.) (Lindley,
J.), quoted in Daniel S. Kleinberger, Carter G. Bishop & Thomas Earl Geu, Charging Orders and
the New Uniform Limited Partnership Act Dispelling Rumors of Disaster, PROB. & PROP., July-
Aug. 2004, at 30, 31.
[Vol. 9:83
To BE OR NOT TO BE EXCLUSIVE
courts' broader use of equity.'20 However, in Olmstead, the court did
not need to resort to the use of its equity power; instead, it selected a
textual approach which gave deference to the explicit words used by
the legislature regardless of the equitable roots of those words in the
charging order statute. Therefore, the Court's opinion is not consis-
tent with the maxim that equity follow the law; as much as it stands for
the proposition that there is no need for the Court to address the
maxim because its rationale stays within the law and well away from
the boundary of law and equity. That is not to say, however, that the
Court was necessarily even aware of the boundary or maxim.
The second maxim-that equity has no jurisdiction where there is
an adequate remedy at law--has been translated more broadly by
some authorities as follows: "[U]nless the legal remedy is as plain, ad-
equate and complete, and as practical in its results, and as efficient in
the administration of justice, as the equitable remedy, the jurisdiction
in equity will attach."'1 21 Again, Olmstead's interpretation of the law
obviates any need for the analysis of this maxim in the opinion. In-
deed, Olmstead's statutory construction reaches the same result in this
case as a determination that the charging order provisions were exclu-
sively coupled with a further determination that the exclusive remedy
provided by the statute was law and was inadequate.
The maxim raises questions of meaning even without reference to
law. One question being what is the definition of a complete legal
remedy. This definitional question again raises the relationship of eq-
uity to separation of powers; this time under the guise of a kind of
statutory preemption under some theory of legislative supremacy.
The key to part of this question is determining the comprehensiveness
and scope of the charging order statute as intended by the legislature.
Answering part of that question, in turn, implicates the legislature's
intended policy balance between the aggregate rights of debtors and
creditors and the place of SMLLCs in that context. Professor Loew-
120. See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 113. Professor McClintock's treatise states as a general
rule:
Where equitable jurisdiction over a particular class of suits has been established be-
cause of the inadequacy of the remedy at law, and the remedy at law has since become
adequate because of extension by judicial decision or statute, it is often said that the
jurisdiction of equity is not thereby diminished, but the principle is not uniformly rec-
ognized, and is disregarded in many cases.
MCCLINTOCK, supra note 113, at 115. Unlike Professor McClintock's treatise, the older treatise
by Professor Eaton expresses no doubt about the matter quoted: "Nor will courts of equity be
ousted of their original jurisdiction because courts of law have adopted equitable principles."
EATON, supra note 114, at 30. Statutes, of course, add to the decisional mix the dimension of
separation of power.
121. EATON, supra note 114, at 30-31 (emphasis added).
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enstein addresses both of these issues in the context of the equitable
theory of piercing the liability shield of corporations. He argues that
non-statutory remedies (i.e., equitable) should be further narrowed
because the business entity statutes have consciously and carefully
balanced the rights, duties and obligations consistent with legislatively
articulated public policy. 12 2 Moreover, he suggests that the applica-
tion of equity to statutory charging orders is narrowed in application
because a "business association statute serves no other purpose [other
than determining the appropriate policy balance] and arguably
'preempts' the field on the issues it resolves."' 123
The question of how to define or describe adequate remedy is also
raised. This definitional question is related to, but independent from,
the comprehensiveness of the statute; but, nonetheless, it may be inde-
pendent from the issue of comprehensiveness. One illustrative issue
nestled within adequate remedy is whether mere inability to collect
from a debtor or a debtor's insolvency renders the legal remedy inade-
quate. A Florida pleading and practice guide suggests one defense to
the use of equitable remedies under those circumstances:
The complaint must show that there are obstacles which prevent the
full enforcement of the judgment in law and the execution and re-
turn nulla bona by the proper officer will suffice in this regard, but
more general allegations that there is no remedy or adequate rem-
edy at law are insufficient. 124
Another boundary is suggested in a Florida appellate court case
where the claimants sought an injunction to freeze an account before
payment of a disputed commission to a real estate broker. It stated in
1984:
The order is plainly wrong. This was an action to recover money
damages upon a claim of breach of an oral contract to pay money;
that is, a commission. Such a cause of action does not entitle the
claimant to equitable relief simply because the complaint alleges un-
certainty of collectability of the judgment if a fund of money is to be
disbursed. The test of the inadequacy of a remedy at law is whether
a judgment could be obtained, not whether once obtained it will be
collectible. 125
122. Mark J. Loewenstein, Veil Piercing to Non-Owners: A Practical and Theoretical Inquiry,
15 (Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-23,
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1660576.
123. Id.
124. 13 JoHN J. DVORSKE, FLA. JUR. CREDrroRs' RIGHTS AND REMEDIES § 288 (2d ed. 2010)
(citations omitted).
125. St. Lawrence Co., N.V. v. Alkow Realty, Inc., 453 So. 2d 514, 514 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984).
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At a minimum these quotes suggest that the mostappropriate time
to seek equitable remedies, absent truly extraordinary circumstances,
is when a judgment at law is returned as uncollectible. This article
necessarily returns to the issue of adequate remedy of law later be-
cause there exist other questions concerning the phrase; first, how-
ever, the article turns to the more general distinction between equity
and law.
EQUITY & INTERPRETATION
"Equity" is neither synonymous with common law nor necessarily
separate from statutory law; indeed, "our substantive law is derived
from common law, from equity, and from statute.' 26 Thus, many
statutory laws are based on recognized equity principles. 127 For exam-
ple, equity first governed the entire substantive areas of trusts and
mortgages, which are now largely statutory.1 28 Moreover, and as a
further illustration, "the concept of fiduciary duty has spread from ex-
press trusts to a whole range of principal-agent relationships." 129 Ar-
guably, courts are using equitable principles and remedies more
broadly than ever before. Professor Laycock, for example, suggests
the maxim that "a court will not grant an equitable remedy if a legal
remedy would be adequate ...is dead . . ."; meaning the maxim
"never constrains a court's decision in any case where the choice of
remedy matters. ' 130
Whether insolvency or uncollectability is enough to make a remedy
at law inadequate (which is part of the distinction above) may be too
theoretically pure to be of practical application in factual situations
similar to Olmstead or in most other real-life situations for that mat-
ter. Simply, the pure issue assumes no independent facts from which
an "equitable right, estate, or interest" could be derived.' 3 ' After not-
126. Laycock, supra note 79, at 67. Perhaps Professor Laycock's most famous article, based
on response in the literature, is entitled "The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule." Douglas
Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687 (1990).
127. Equity uses principles. Leonard I. Rotman, Is Fiduciary Law Efficient? A Preliminary
Analysis, 24 (Oct. 8, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.con/
abstract=1485853. Law uses rules. Id. Thus it creates a kind of tension. It echoes recent de-
bates about rule-based and principle-based accounting. See Rebecca Toppe Shortridge & Mark
Myring, Defining Principles-Based Accounting Standards, THE CPA JOURNAL ONLINE (Aug.
2004), http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/804/essentials/p34.htm.
128. See generally EATON, supra note 114 (explanation of areas covered by equity in the early
Twentieth Century); John H. Langbein, Why Did Trust Law Become Statute Law in the United
States?, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1069 (2007) (explanation of areas covered by equity today).
129. Laycock, supra note 79, at 68.
130. Laycock, supra note 79, at 54-55.
131. EATON, supra note 114, at 26 (emphasis added).
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ing that many such rights are generally termed "a trust estate," the
previously cited "old treatise" observed there are "many other" equi-
table rights and interests that (at the turn of the century when the
treatise was written) were not recognized "in law courts.' 32 These
interests included, among others "the mortgagor's equity of redemp-
tion" and "equitable lienors."'1 33
Equitable rights and interests can be viewed as merely component
parts of equitable remedies, but historically they were independent
from remedies because they provided the separate equity courts con-
current jurisdiction with the law courts. 34 "Concurrent jurisdiction
will not be exercised unless there is some equitable circumstance to
give jurisdiction; such as fraud, irreparable injury, trust, accident, or
the like."'1 35 Where equity has an independent source of "jurisdic-
tion", it is arguably not necessary for courts to determine no adequate
remedy at law is available. 136 At least one influential court, however,
132. EATON, supra note 114, at 27.
133. Mortgage law was at one time entirely equitable but, even after codification, equitable
mortgages still exist. For example, a South Dakota case decided in 2006 recharacterized a pur-
ported real property sale as an equitable mortgage where a transfer by a warranty deed was
followed immediately by a contract for deed. Myers v. Eich, 720 N.W.2d 76 (S.D. 2006). This
decision illustrates, in a general way, how equity "thinks" and how courts apply it. In other
words it conveys a sense of equity.
Illustratively, the opinion states: (1) "the recharacterization of a document is an equitable
remedy," id. at 82 (citing Englehart v. Larson, 566 N.W.2d 152, 155 (S.D. 1997)); (2) the trial
court has discretion to grant or deny equitable remedies, id.; (3) the standard of review is abuse
of discretion, id. (citing Adrian v. McKinnie, 639 N.W.2d 529, 533 (S.D. 2002)); (4) "'Equity
requires that the transaction be treated according to its substance and effect, not its form[,]"' id.
(quoting Star Enterprise v. Thomas, 783 F. Supp. 1564, 1568 (D.R.I. 1992)); (5) "A purported
absolute conveyance may be recharacterized as a mortgage, depending on the ... parties' in-
tent," Myers, 720 N.W.2d at 83 (citing Adrian, 639 N.W.2d at 533); and, (6) The most important
time for determining the intent of the parties is "at the inception of their relationship." Id.
(citing Abberton v. Stephens, 747 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)). Finally, the opinion
describes the appropriate attitude of a court when using its discretion to exercise its equitable
powers: "if facts plainly exist to warrant equitable relief and no facts exist to disentitle a party to
such relief, then a court is not free simply to ignore the remedy in the name of discretion. Con-
sistency and fairness require courts to decide similar cases similarly." Id. at 82 (quoting Adrian,
639 N.W.2d at 533).
134. EATON, supra note 114, at 30.
135. EATON, supra note 114, at 30. "Accident," as used in the quote, has a meaning to some-
what related to both "mistake" and "impossibility." Cf. EATON, supra note 114, at 223 (failure
of technical signing requirements).
136. Professor McClintock's treatise states as a general rule: "Many courts have held that
fraud is itself a basis for the exercise of equity jurisdiction, even though the remedy at law may
be adequate." MCCLINTOCK, supra note 113, at 117 (the treatise suggests this is the English rule
but that it does not appear to be the majority rule in the United States. MCCLINTOCK, supra
note 113, at 118.).
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held both an independent source of jurisdiction and no adequate rem-
edy[ies] at law are required.1 37
Fraud is one illustration of an "equitable circumstance" that gives a
court equity jurisdiction: "As a general rule, courts of equity exercise
a general jurisdiction in cases of fraud, sometimes concurrent with and
sometimes exclusive of other courts."'1 38 Historically, "fraud" in-
cluded both actual and constructive fraud,139 and equitable remedies
137. A frequently cited Delaware Supreme Court case, DuPont v. DuPont, 85 A.2d 724 (Del.
1951), discussed the constitutionally determined jurisdiction of the Delaware Chancery Court. It
touches on both meanings of jurisdiction and describes the importance of the phrase "an ade-
quate remedy at law." At issue was whether the court had equitable power to award separate
maintenance of a spouse due to abandonment. Id. at 730. The answer required determining,
first, whether the legislature had constitutional authority to vest jurisdiction of all matrimonial
matters in a separate Family Court apart from Chancery. Id. at 726. Second, whether an ade-
quate remedy of law was available and that the Court of Chancery could not exercise such juris-
diction if it had it. Id. at 729.
The Court analyzed the first question by determining whether the British Court of Chancery
would have had jurisdiction of such matters when the state constitution was ratified followed by
vetting several amendments to the state's (Delaware) constitutional provision. Id. at 729. The
Court held that the Delaware Constitution guaranteed the equitable jurisdiction of the Chancery
Court to be at least that of the British Chancery Court in the late eighteenth century and, there-
fore, that the legislature could not strip it of its jurisdiction over certain matters that it had by
statute transferred to Family Court. DuPont, 85 A.2d at 730.
The constitutional provision cited by the Court as establishing carry-over jurisdiction, how-
ever, also contained a provision modifying it. The provision "is to the effect that the Chancellor
shall not hear and determine any cause where a sufficient remedy exists at law." Id. at 729.
Thus, the Chancery Court could not exercise its jurisdiction if the statute establishing the Family
Court also provided an adequate remedy at law. The latter was the second question in the case.
Regarding the second question in the case, the Delaware Supreme Court found that there was
no adequate remedy at law. Id. at 734. Therefore, circa 1951, Chancery Court had both jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter and the authority to exercise it to provide equitable relief for main-
tenance to an abandoned spouse. See, Johnson, supra, note 89 (footnote omitted) (containing an
excellent discussion of DuPont and of the equity powers of Delaware Courts over business orga-
nizations, generally, arguing the Delaware Constitution makes fiduciary duties unavailable in its
unincorporated entity, a.k.a. "alternative entity," law).
138. EATON, supra note 114, at 283.
139. EATON, supra note 114, at 283. There are two classes of fraud in equity: actual and
constructive fraud.
Actual Fraud
Actual fraud arises from facts and circumstances of imposition, and may be described
as something said, done, or omitted by a person with the design of perpetrating what he
must have known to be a positive fraud.
EATON, supra note 114, at 287.
Constructive Fraud
Constructive fraud may be described as an act done or omitted, not with actual design
to perpetrate positive fraud or injury upon other persons, but which, nevertheless,
amounts to positive fraud, or is construed as a fraud by the court because of its detri-
mental effect upon public interests and public or private confidence.
EATON, supra note 114, at 287.
Relief from and, Remedies for, Fraud
A treatise published nearly 50 years after Eaton said:
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for fraud included constructive trusts, equitable liens, setting aside
fraudulent conveyances, 140 and appointing receivers. 141 Other equity-
based remedies include pre-judgment asset freezing injunctions
("Mareva Injunctions") 142 and the removal of the veil of limited liabil-
Equity can declare a person who has been guilty of fraud to be a constructive trustee of
the property he has received in the transaction, and to account for it as trustee; or it can
impose an equitable lien to secure return of the consideration; or it can compel him to
make good on the representations on which the other party has acted.
MCCLINTOCK, supra note 113, at 229. See EATON, supra note 114, at 411 (Eaton seems to go
further than the quoted language from McClintock stating that a constructive trust may be im-
pressed, "on the grounds of justice and good conscience, without reference to the intention of
the parties.").
140. Fraudulent conveyance law is another example, like charging order law, of a notion that
started as equity but became statutory. Therefore, it raises similar issues as those previously
noted; like the effect the adoption of a statute has on equity, equity jurisdiction, and the availa-
bility of equitable remedies.
Florida has a statutory fraudulent transfers act entitled the "Florida Uniform Fraudulent
Transfers Act" (FUFTA), FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 222.29-222.30, 726.101 (West 2010). Like similar
statutes, FUFTA has an exception for transfers where reasonable value is received by the debtor
in exchange for the transfer. Id. § 726.109(1). Whether the exchange of individually owned
property for LLC interests is equivalent seems to be one of the pressure points in the application
of the statutes. The latter issue is similar, to some degree, to the "vanishing value" issue in the
law of wealth transfer taxation. See generally JEFFREY N. PENNELL & ALAN NEWMAN, ESTATE
AND TRUST PLANNING 419 (2005). Nonetheless, based on the authors' conversations with other
lawyers, it seems that the power of the constructive fraud provision of UFTA (Uniform Fraudu-
lent Transfer Act) is underestimated. Section 4 of UFTA provides in part a transfer is fraudulent
as to both present and future creditors if the debtor:
(2) without receiving reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obli-
gation, and the debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or transaction for which the
remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business
or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he [or
she] would incur, debts beyond his [or her] ability to pay as they came due.
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS Acr, § 4(a)(2), 7A U.L.A. 58 (2006) (the quoted paragraph
concerns constructive fraud and does not require proof of intent; the traditional badges of fraud
are codified to prove actual fraud).
141. See, e.g., MCCLINTOCK, supra note 113, at 229, 553, 557.
142. Injunctions are equity. See generally chapter 22 of EATON, supra note 114, at 563-605.
Contempt is a possible sanction for violation of an injunction. The use of foreign asset protec-
tion trusts (APTs) has sometimes, but rarely, drawn contempt sanctions including incarceration.
See, e.g., FTC v. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d 1228, 1244 (9th Cir. 1999) (more commonly re-
ferred to as "the Anderson case"). See also generally Duncan E. Osborne & Elizabeth Schurig,
A Comparison of Foreign and Delaware APTs - Advantages of Delaware APTs, 2 ASSET PRO.
TECTION: DOM. & INT'L L. & TACTICS § 14A:146 (2010).
According to a Uniform Laws Commission (ULC) Memorandum, there is a great deal of
inconsistency between and among the various states and the United States concerning freezing
orders since Grupo Mexicano de Dessarro S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 333
(1999) (no equity jurisdiction for Federal Courts for prejudgment asset freezing order where
only money damages sought unless otherwise provided by Congress). ULC has a drafting pro-
ject for a uniform state act. Memorandum from Michael Getty, Chair, Study Comm. on Mareva
Injunctions to ULC Comm. on Scope and Programs 1 (Oct. 14, 2009), available at http://www.
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ity provided by an entity ("piercing the veil" or as applied in circum-
stances similar to Olmstead "reverse piercing"). 143
An important point of the discussion of equity for purposes of this
article is simply that none of these equitable principles were discussed
by Olmstead, though it appears the Court could have done so.144 An-
other point is that the principles are not necessarily modified or modi-
fiable by the addition of a simple statutory exclusivity clause. As a
result, the existence of equitable actions is a confounding variable for
statutory drafters in determining the scope of "exclusive" and how to
draft it. For example, assuming that reverse piercing is available,
nccusl.org/Update/DocsfMareva%2o1njunctions/Marevalnjunctions-Getty%20memo- /20Oct
%2014%2009.pdf.
143. A classic corporate case concerning the liability of owners for corporate debts stated:
"Broadly speaking, the courts will disregard the corporate form, or, to use accepted terminology,
'pierce the corporate veil,' whenever necessary 'to prevent fraud or achieve equity."' Walkovsky
v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 7 (N.Y. 1966) (quoting Int'l Aircraft Trading Co. v. Mfrs. Trust, 79
N.E.2d 249, 252 (N.Y. 1948)). A "reverse pierce" occurs where a judgment creditor of an owner
is allowed to "pierce" to the assets owned by an entity. For the suggestion that even complete
unity ownership should not justify making the assets of the venture available to satisfy the judg-
ment-creditor was made where none of the elements necessary for piercing was present (other
than perhaps the conclusory statement that it would be unjust to the judgment-creditor), see
Evans v. Galardi, 546 P.2d 313, 317 (Cal. 1976). Piercing, forward or reverse, is an equitable
remedy that calls for setting aside the asset partitioning that is otherwise provided for by statute.
See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.6-220(2) (West 2010) (shareholder not liable for debts and
obligations of a business corporation); id. § 275.150(1) (member of LLC not liable for debts and
obligations of an LLC); id. § 275.240 (property of LLC is that of the LLC as a legal entity in
which the members have no interest).
In circumstances in which piercing is appropriate, there is no policy basis for permitting an
exclusivity provision to preclude that result. See Carter G. Bishop, Reverse Piercing: A Single
Member LLC Paradox, 54 S.D. L. REv. 199, 214, 231-32 (2009). Bishop quotes REVISED UNIF.
LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 503(g) cmt. Subsection g, 6B U.L.A. 498-501 (2008), which notes that the
exclusivity of the charging order remedy is not designed to override reverse piercing: "This sub-
section is not intended to prevent a court from effecting a "reverse pierce" where appropriate."
Id. For another excellent treatment of the issues raised by the asset protection features of LLCs,
see Larry E. Ribstein, Reverse Limited Liability and the Design of Business Associations, 30 DEL.
J. CoRP. L. 199 (2005). For further discussion of piercing, see infra note 170.
144. Arguably, the Florida Supreme Court could have addressed the equitable issues even
under the certified question. First, the question was modified by the Court from one that ex-
pressly referenced the charging order provision to a broader one referencing generic "Florida
law." FTC v. Olmstead, 528 F.3d 1310, 1311 (11th Cir. 2008). "Florida law" seems to include all
law in the unified court system to include common law, equity, and statutes.
Further, but still arguably, the Court could have addressed equity under the question as origi-
nally certified for one or a combination of the following three reasons: First, the Court stated
"Under Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, proceedings in aid of judgment or
execution are to be conducted in accordance 'with the procedure of the state where the court is
located'." Id. at 1313. Second, the same opinion stated: "In certifying this question, we do not
intend to restrict the issues considered by the state court [citations omitted]" and "we ask for
guidance." Id. at 1314. Third, the authority for the Federal District Court entering the original
injunction in this case was, in part, derived from equity because it entered a freezing order (a
type of injunction). See generally supra note 142 (discussing Mareva orders).
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there is the question to whether, in the context of an LLC, reverse
piercing would be precluded by the addition of a simple "exclusivity"
phrase to the charging order provision.145
Indeed, the use of a separate and freestanding equitable cause of
action seems to raise fewer difficult jurisprudence and separation-of-
powers questions than an equitable interpretation of the statute be-
cause it is a distinct action independent from the statute based on spe-
cial and identifiable circumstances (such as fraud). 146 Stated another
way for emphasis, an equitable remedy can be a remedy for a separate
equitable action for fraud and is neither necessarily nor solely an ex-
traordinary remedy auxiliary to the charging order statute.
As previously discussed, a relatively well-known example of a sepa-
rate action that provides an equitable remedy is piercing the liability
protection afforded by (and to) an entity.147 Fraud is conceptually
identifiable, even if not factually certain. That is, occurs frequently
enough and over a large enough range of circumstances to be a signifi-
cant category, while at the same time sharing a compositional core
across that broad range of situations. This frequency of occurrence
and identifiable composition makes fraud an independent equitable
action apart from law and; therefore, almost by definition, not in con-
flict with law.
Conversely, and for interpretive purposes, the credible classification
of situations covered by equitable fraud hold true even if fraud's inde-
pendence from law is ignored. That is: (1) fraud is a credible situa-
tional classification satisfying Llewellyn's conditions for appropriate
145. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 275.260(1) (West 2010). See supra note 36 and accompa-
nying text ("choice of law" and a brief reference to selected jurisdictional issues which is a con-
founding variable for application of statutes). A good illustration of the normative
interrelationship between statutes and equity (as well as other law) is the discussion in the
Southern Methodist University Symposium on Revised Article 1 and Proposed Revised Article
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Robyn L. Meadows discusses the standard for displacing
other law under Uniform Commercial Code Section 1-103, specifically, whether displacement
should be broadened "either by deleting references to explicit displacement, thus permitting
displacement by implication, or by redrafting the comments to permit broader preemption."
Robyn L. Meadows, Code Arrogance and Displacement of Common Law and Equity: A Defense
of Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 SMU L. REV. 535, 537 (2001). She argues
"that broadening the preemptive scope of the code is not only unnecessary, but ill advised." Id.
See also generally Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common Law? - Recent Ameri-
can Codifications and Their Impact on Judicial Practices and The Law's Subsequent Develop-
ment, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 1119 (1994).
146. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 53(b)(2) (West 2010) ("Upon a proper showing that, weighing the
equities and considering the [Federal Trade] Commission's likelihood of success, such action
would be in the public interest[.]"). See supra note 142 (discussing Mareva orders).
147. One of the elements under some formulations of the test for piercing is "fraud on the
public." See supra note 139. For further discussion of piercing the veil of limited liability, see
supra note 143 and infra note 170.
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"cooperative-partner" statutory interpretation, and (2) fraud identi-
fies those situations as a class not intended by the legislature to be
governed by the charging order provision. 148 Further, recognition of a
class of equitable fraud situations creates two distinct classes for pur-
poses of the charging order statute: (1) judgment debtors and (2) judg-
ment debtors who perpetrated some sort of fraud upon the judgment
creditor. 149 The charging order is available against both classes of
judgment debtors. Equitable actions or additional equitable remedies
beyond those provided at law (or statutorily) are available only
against judgment debtors of the second class: those who perpetrated
some sort of fraud.
Recognition of equitable fraud either as (i) a separate equitable
cause of action, or (2) as a distinguishable class of situations not in-
tended to have the benefit of the express statutory charging order;
provides a break from the focus on exclusive in the Florida LLC Act.
Equitable fraud applies across all statutes and would invite the rea-
soned and deliberative policy analysis contemplated by Professor
Lowenstein (though by courts not legislators) even in states whose
statutes include the "exclusive" language.
Finally, in addition to the other ways a court might avoid the strict
application of the charging order statute, the class distinction concept
might suggest a way to work equitable remedies as supplementary to
the statutory remedy of the charging order (rather than as a remedy
for an independent wrong, or as a class of situations not intended to
be subjected to the statute), while remaining true to the maxim "eq-
uity follows the law." That way brings the introductory analysis of
equity in this article, as previously promised, back full circle to the
maxim, "unless the legal remedy is plain, adequate and complete, and
as practical in its results, and as efficient in the administration of jus-
tice as the equitable remedy, the jurisdiction in equity will attach.' 150
The maxim was previously discussed as part of the role statutory
interpretation plays in the larger context of judicial equitable powers
and the separation of powers.' 51 The specific question raised, but not
previously answered, was whether the charging order represented
such a comprehensive scheme as to preempt the field of judgment-
creditor protection from judicial exercise of equity.152 The current
148. And, therefore, also complies with Llewellyn's situational sense requirement for proper
interpretation. See supra note 76.
149. Needless to say all of the latter categories fall within the former, but not vice-versa.
150. EATON, supra note 114, at 34-35.
151. See supra notes 88-110 and accompanying text.
152. Equity as used here is used in its softens the law meaning; not its natural law meaning.
See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
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discussion focuses on a different but related question: Whether equity
can supplement an inadequate remedy at law for a legal cause of ac-
tion where there is no concurrent equity jurisdiction based on a sepa-
rate equitable right or cause of action, for example, where there is no
fraud.153
The two "old" equity treatises that have served as the foundation
with which to frame the equitable issues for this article are not in com-
plete accord as to whether equity jurisdiction may attach only for an
inadequate remedy at law. The older of the two treatises ambiguously
indicates that an equitable remedy may require independent equitable
jurisdiction not acquired simply because of an inadequate remedy at
law.154 The "newer" treatise hedges its statement. Illustratively, in
the case of insolvency, it says:
Though there are not a great many cases holding that insolvency
alone makes the remedy at law inadequate so that equity may give
relief in a proper case because ordinarily plaintiff is able to find
some other basis for applying to equity, there are a few well rea-
soned cases to that effect, and the great weight of judicial opinion is
in accord. 15 5
The quoted material illustrates the level of confusion caused by the
phrase equity jurisdiction. All courts, be they law courts, equitable
chancery courts, or unified courts, must meet subject-matter and per-
sonal jurisdiction requirements in order to exercise power. Unless
specifically limited by the state constitution or a constitutionally valid
statute thereunder; however, a court of general jurisdiction in a uni-
153. A notion that seems to support the independent existence of equitable causes of action,
perhaps in addition to no adequate remedy at law, is to the effect of, "[t]his court is committed to
the doctrine that no person has the right to maintain a bill in equity unless the suit brought falls
within some acknowledged head of equity jurisprudence[.]" B.L.E. Realty Corp. v. Mary Wil-
liams Co., 134 So. 47, 50 (Fla. 1931). A "bill of equity" is
brought by a creditor who has secured judgment at law, and has in vain attempted at
law to obtain satisfaction, and who sues in equity for the purpose of reaching property
which cannot be reached by execution at law. The nature, purpose, and scope of such
bill is to bring into exercise the equitable power of the court to enforce satisfaction of a
judgment by means of an equitable execution because equitable execution at law can-
not be had.
Id. at 49.
154. It states:
The inadequacy of the legal remedy may be said to be the foundation of the concurrent
jurisdiction of courts of equity. The concurrent jurisdiction covers all cases in which no
adequate remedy can be obtained at law except by circuity of action or by multiplicity
of suits, and adequate and complete relief can be given in equity in one and the same
action; as in the cases of accident, mistake, and fraud.
EATON, supra note 114, at 32 (the listed examples are all equitable causes; therefore, it seems
jurisdiction must be based on something in addition to inadequate remedy at law).
155. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 113, at 113.
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fied court system has power to adjudicate using both law and equity if
it has both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. Equity jurisdic-
tion, before the merger of law and equity, did not mean jurisdiction in
the subject matter or personal jurisdictional sense. Rather:
[1It was traditionally used to refer to the body of equitable prece-
dents, practices, and attitudes .... Sometimes courts would say that
if the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law, they would dismiss
the claim "for want of equity jurisdiction". . . . But the phrase
means no such thing .... For clarity, the term equity jurisdiction
might well be avoided. 156
The phrase was and is still used in the context of whether there is a
right to a jury (law); 157 but, usually the right to a jury trial can be
framed as a distinct question from jurisdiction. In any event, if there
is an inadequate remedy at law, and there is no constitutionally valid
limitation on the range of remedies, a court has equitable jurisdiction
to provide equitable remedies beyond statutory remedies as a supple-
mental aid to the statute. Of course, the court would need to heed the
maxim, equity follows the law.158 This conclusion is consistent with an
article quoting a Delaware Chancery opinion: "[t]his court will use its
'broad discretion' to tailor [a remedy] to suit the situation as it exists.
156. DAN B. DOBBS, 1 DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES - EourrY - RESTITUTION § 2.7,
at 180 (2d ed. 1993).
157. James Parsons' treatise states:
The Court determines the legal effect of the contract, but its terms, if oral, are found
by jury .... If it is in writing, the court interprets the meaning of the parties and
determines the legal effect of the parties. If the contract is not in writing, the jury finds
what the contract was, and the court decides the legal effect of it.
JAMES PARSONS, PRINCIPLES OF PARTNERSHIP § 21, at 44 (1889). For a modern partnership case
that turns on the law-equity distinction, see Mundhenke v. Holm, 787 N.W.2d 302 (S.D. 2010).
The court addressed the pendent incidental jurisdiction doctrine wherein a court acting in equity,
under former law, could decide incidental matters of law that would ordinarily require a jury. Id.
at 306. The court stated that the parties agreed that the question of the partnership's existence
was a question of law, and the case was tried on that basis. Id. at 307. This suggests the court
had second thoughts about whether the existence of a partnership is law or equity. See also
Holcomb v. Davis, 431 S.W.2d 881, 883 (Ky. 1968) (applying quantum meruit); Doyle v. Miller,
No. 95-CA-00223-MR, slip op. at 1-2 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 1996) (applying equitable laches
rather than a legal statute of limitations to the question of the timeliness of a petition for an
accounting). For a discussion of the issues arising from the merger of law courts and equity
courts, such as the right to a jury trial, see generally W. Hamilton Bryson, The Merger of Com-
mon Law and Equity Pleading in Virginia, 41 U. RICH. L. REv. 77 (2006); see also Charles D.
McDaniel, Jr., Note, First National Bank of Dewitt v. Cruthis: An Analysis of the Right to a Jury
Trial in Arkansas After the Merger of Law and Equity, 60 ARK. L. REV. 563, 568 (2007) (identify-
ing five states that recently merged their law courts and equity courts as West Virginia, Rhode
Island, Florida, Alabama and Maryland). For an analysis of the law-equity distinction in English
law, see Andrew Burrows, We Do This At Common Law But That In Equity, 22 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002).
158. See supra notes 113-125 and accompanying text (discussing the equity maxims: "equity
follows the law" and "inadequate remedy at law").
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As Delaware has long recognized, 'the Court of Chancery [has] the
inherent power to adapt its relief to the particular rights and liabilities
of each party." 159
In summary, even this limited "hornbook" overview of equity sug-
gests that courts have a great deal of flexibility either in fashioning
equitable remedies consistent with statutory remedies, or in the aid of
extending equity in statutes sounding in equitable principles. The
most powerful exercise of equitable jurisdiction, in the appropriate
case, might be for a court to avoid addressing the statutory remedies.
For example, in a case involving a charging order statute, a court
might identify a separate and distinct equitable wrong like fraud. 160
The court may then unleash the full panoply of equitable remedies,
including remedies like constructive trusts and reverse piercing.
Unfortunately unleashing equity is not a panacea. Even the equita-
ble power yielded in Delaware over corporate matters has not been
immune from criticism. One author, for example, begins an article by
stating: "[w]hile Delaware jurisprudence is renowned for its clarity
and sophistication, one area of its corporate law is, by design, un-
characteristically ambiguous: equitable remedies.1' 61 The author
concludes the article with the observation that, while "equitable doc-
trines play an important role in providing justice to an aggrieved party
"; they are, "potent, amorphous, and ambiguous . . . . Unless
courts keep a laser-sharp focus on the purpose of these remedies, they
threaten to unravel much of the fabric of our law. ' 162 It is remarkable
that the ambiguousness of equity, according to the same article, is by
design. The designed ambiguity may be the source of equity's flexibil-
ity that, in fact, makes it efficient. For example, the equitable notion
of fiduciary duty has been called the "most doctrinally pure expres-
sion of equity."'1 63 Yet fiduciary duty is famously ambiguous for the
same reason that all of equity is ambiguous; because "the fiduciary
159. Mary Siegel, The Dangers of Equitable Remedies, 15 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 86 (2009)
(quoting Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., 873 A.2d 305, 312 (Del. Ch. 2005), Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v.
Cantor, No. 16297, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *9 (May 11, 2001), Hanby v. Wereschak, 207
A.2d 369, 370 (Del. 1965)).
160. As a very general matter, "equity has the authority to relieve against fraud[.]" 27A AM.
JUR. 2 D Equity § 5 (2010). Further: "[F]raud in equity has a much broader connotation than at
law and includes acts inconsistent with fair dealing and good conscience[.]" Id. See also supra
notes 136-140.
161. Siegel, supra note 159, at 86.
162. Siegel, supra note 159, at 126.
163. Leonard I. Rotman, Is Fiduciary Law Efficient? A Preliminary Analysis, 4 (SSRN Work-
ing Paper Series, presented at the Remedies Discussion Forum held in Aix-en-Provence, Fr.,
June 5-6, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1485853. Fiduciary duty is over 300 years
old in English common law and similar principles were in Roman civil law. Id. at 8.
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concept is potentially applicable to an infinite variety of actors in-
volved in an infinite number of circumstances.' 164 Equitable fiduciary
duty may be efficient-at least in select circumstances-because it is a
necessary systemic counterweight to the "efficient contract breach" at
law.165
The "tension" between law and equity was addressed explicitly in a
2005 article written by Justice Jacobs of the Delaware Supreme
Court.166 Justice Jacobs' article said:
[T]he dispute [between law and equity in corporate law] created
and continues to create tension between the need for a flexible set
of rules that promote fair treatment of investors, and the policy, en-
dorsed by transactional planners, that favors a set of bright-line
rules that promote clarity and predictability. 167
After analyzing the "law model," the "equity model," and setting
forth a brief history of equity in Delaware corporate law, Judge Jacobs
observed (as of 2005) that he:
[V]iew[s] the [Delaware] Supreme Court's apparent movement
away from equity not as an attempt to get rid of equity, but as a
mid-course adjustment .... develop[ing] a bright line rule that
would make the application of equity more predictable .... [and
that] the concept of wrapping law around equity is a great idea, if it
can be carried off. 168
164. Id. at 3.
165. Rotman summarized as follows:
It may be plausibly suggested that the fiduciary concept's focus on the preservation of
important relationships is "efficient," even in contrast to the notion of efficient breach,
insofar as it maintains the viability of necessary relations in interdependent societies by
preserving the trust of those who engage in them. The fiduciary concept instills a
greater degree of predictability in these interactions[.]
Id. at 20 (footnotes omitted). The tension created between (and because of) the poles of effi-
cient breach and fiduciary duty may be a necessary for law's stability and flexibility. There is
growing literature on law as a complex adaptive system. See, e.g., J. B. Ruhl, Regulation by
Adaptive Management - Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 21 (2005) (and citations
therein); Thomas Earl Geu, The Tao of Jurisprudence: Chaos, Brain Science, Synchronicity, and
the Law, 61 TENN. L. REV. 933, 955-75 (1994); Complexity Theory in Legal Scholarship, JURIS-
DYNAMICS.BLOGSPOT.COM, http://jurisdynamics.blogspot.com/2006/07/complexity-theory-in-
legal-scholarship.html (bibliography).
166. Jack B. Jacobs, The Uneasy Truce Between Law and Equity in Modern Business Enter-
prise Jurisprudence, 8 DEL. L. REV. 1 (2005).
167. Id. at 2.
168. Id. at 15. Professor Johnson argues that under the Delaware Constitution, at least, the
legal wrapper cannot mandatorily constrain the equitable power of the courts and, therefore,
staying within the wrapper is voluntary by the courts. See Johnson, supra note 89. See also
Grace Murphy Long, Comment, The Sunset of Equity: Constructive Trusts and the Law-Equity
Dichotomy, 57 ALA. L. REV. 875, 906 (2006) ("Although Alabama courts place clear limitations
on equitable relief, making the remedy appear more legal, constructive trusts still retain some of
their equitable attributes."). It is possible that the entire subject of equity is slowly disappearing
2010]
124 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:83
The tension between, and the design of, law and equity, therefore,
seems to be creative and evolutionary.169
Again, and for the third time in this article, another well-worn ex-
ample of ambiguity as a design feature of equity is piercing the liabil-
ity veil of an entity. 170 Indeed, Professor Loewenstein, as previously
from our system because of lack of familiarity and attention. Professor McClintock, in the 1948
edition of his treatise on equity, warned:
A problem with more practical aspects is the problem of the classification of equity in
our legal system, and in law school curricula. It has been earnestly advocated that we
should no longer regard equity as a separate system, but as merely a part of each
branch of the law with which it deals, remedies and procedure, property, contracts,
torts and so on. Whatever may be thought of the logic of that practice, it is apparent
that it will be difficult to preserve the characteristic features of equity, its discretion and
adaptability, if it is nowhere considered as a whole. If it is not, as some contend, inevi-
table that those characteristics will be lost anyway under the combined system, it is
highly probable that they cannot survive when the various aspects of the system are
separately treated and often taught and applied by men who have no adequate founda-
tion themselves on which to base an exposition of the characters. The only hope for the
preservation of equity lies in a continuous study of it as a system based on fundamental
conceptions, but applied in all of the various fields of law.
MCCLINTOCK, supra note 113, § 7, at 18-19 (footnotes omitted).
169. Justice Jacobs, for example, observed that federal securities law has, at a couple times in
history, evolved to fill niches or gaps in state law. Jacobs, supra note 166, at 1. Therefore the
federal securities law could be said to "co-evolve" with state enterprise law.
170. See supra note 143 (discussing piercing the veil in greater detail). Professor Mark J.
Loewenstein quotes two of the leading scholars in corporate law in veil piercing in his article,
Veil Piercing to Non-owners: A Practical and Theoretical Inquiry, supra note 122. First, he quotes
Robert Clark: "'[C]ases attempting to pierce the corporate veil are unified more by the remedy
sought - subjecting to corporate liabilities the personal assets directly held by shareholders -
than by repeated and consistent application of the same criteria for the remedy."' Loewenstein,
supra note 122, at 2 n.8, (citation omitted). He then quotes Stephen M. Bainbridge: "'The pre-
sent state of veil piercing doctrine allows judges to impose their own brand of rough justice
without being overly concerned with precedent or appellate review."' Loewenstein, supra note
122, at 3 n.12 (citation omitted). He then summarizes another argument by Robert Clark:
"[Clark argues] that veil piercing is employed by the courts when other doctrines, principally,
fraudulent conveyance, are found lacking and moral precepts support denying limited liability
for an entity's owner." Loewenstein, supra note 122, at 8 n.55.
In addition, Professor Loewenstein discusses the "privilege theory" of corporations as the
traditional policy reason for limited liability; i.e., limited liability relies on the personality of the
entity which is granted by law. Loewenstein, supra note 122, at 5. Another possible policy rea-
son would sound as a tragedy of the commons market related hypothesis. See supra note 165
(fiduciary law as polar opposite to efficient breach). This article, however, adds and emphasizes
that simple asset partitioning may be a primary reason for the demarcation between owners'
personal creditors and the creditors of the entity. See supra notes 90 and 143 and accompanying
text.
Discussion of the various tests for piercing is beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, a
common element in the cases is that failure to pierce would result in "fraud or injustice." Loew-
enstein, supra note 122, at 7. Another doctrine closely related to, and sometimes subsumed by,
veil piercing is the use of agency law to find the dominant owner liable for the obligations of the
entity. That is, the owner(s) so control and dominate the entity as to become its principal in the
principal-agency relationship. Loewenstein, supra note 122, at 8 (stating the use of the agency
theory is largely confined to parent subsidiary relationships). Moreover, this theory, it seems,
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discussed, argues that business entity statutes should be interpreted as
preempting piercing and other equitable doctrine because those stat-
utes have already balanced the rights, obligations and risks as a matter
of public policy.' 71 Lowenstein further warns of legislative push-back
if and when judicial decisions alter that balance because of increased
transactions costs.172
Nonetheless, different kinds of equitable tools and machinery have
evolved historically in response to factual environments similar to
those in Olmstead. The California limited partnership law (then in
effect) for example, spawned an instructive line of cases which
culminated in the fashioning of an undue-interference standard for or-
dering the foreclosure of a charging order. The California charging
order provision that was interpreted did not address foreclosure. In
his analysis of this line of cases, Professor Hynes quotes Hellman v.
Anderson for the Court's expression of the original policy behind the
charging order and why that policy required flexibility in application
of remedies:
[T]he policy underlying the Uniform Partnership Act [is] avoiding
undue interference with partnership business .... In some cases,
foreclosure might cause a partner with essential managerial skills to
abandon the partnership. In other cases, foreclosure would appear
to have no appreciable effect on the conduct of partnership busi-
ness. Thus, the effect of foreclosure on the partnership should be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis by the trial court in connection
with its equitable power to order a foreclosure. 173
might be used to find dominant non-owners liable. Loewenstein, supra note 122, at 11. Another
theory, the instrumentality theory, is relatively close to, but distinct from, agency theory. A
corporation, for example, may be found to be a mere instrumentality where the "controlled cor-
poration has, so to speak, no separate mind, will or existence of its own and is but a business
conduit for its principal." 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF CORPORATIONS, § 43, at 303 (West 2006).
171. Loewenstein, supra note 122, at 15 ("The statutes are crafted to balance the interests of
the various constituencies of the entity - owners, managers and third parties dealing with the
entity - regarding the rights and obligations of the owners and managers."). Moreover, he sug-
gests that it is narrowed because a "business association statute serves no other purpose and
arguably 'preempts' the field on the issues it resolves." Loewenstein, supra note 122, at 15. See
also supra note 145 and accompanying text.
172. Loewenstein, supra note 122, at 15 ("Judicial decisions that alter this balance and allow a
creditor to pierce the veil of an entity and hold an owner liable, result in legislative push-back,
add transaction costs as parties seek to contract around the judicial incursion, or create uncer-
tainty and additional litigation.") (footnotes omitted). Unpopular decisions in "bad cases," how-
ever, may create legislative push-back against impregnable statutory charging order provision.
See supra note 171.
173. J. Dennis Hynes, The Charging Order: Conflicts Between Partners and Creditors, 25 PAC.
L.J. 1, 12 (1993) (quoting Hellman v. Anderson, 284 Cal. Rptr. 830, 837-38 (Ct. App. 1991)).
Neither California's limited partnership nor general partnership charging order statutes applica-
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ble to this line of cases provided for foreclosure of a partnership interest. All the cases involved
determining the circumstances under which a court could order such a sale.
According to Professor Hynes, one of the first charging order cases "stated that the charging
order provision was 'not intended to protect a debtor partner against claims of his judgment
creditors where no legitimate interest of the partnership, or of the remaining partners is to be
served."' Hynes, supra note 173, at 8 (quoting Taylor v. S&M Lamp Company, 12 Cal. Rptr.
323, 328 (Ct. App. 1961)). This is very close to one of the basic arguments in the Olmstead
decision. See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text. In addition, it is in accord with a state-
ment by Jay Adkisson. See supra note 90.
Approximately thirty years later, in Centurion Corporation v. Crocker National Bank, the gen-
eral partner in a limited partnership had consented to the foreclosure sale but the sole limited
partner objected because his interest was not assignable under the limited partnership agree-
ment. See Hynes, supra note 173, at 7-8. According to Hynes, the court expanded the S&M
Lamp Company language and, "concluded that California law 'seems to contemplate' sale of a
partnership interest 'where three conditions are met: first, the creditor has previously obtained a
charging order; second, the judgment nevertheless remains unsatisfied; and third, all partners
other than the debtor have consented to the sale of the interest."' Hynes, supra note 173, at 8
(quoting Centurion Corp. v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 255 Cal. Rptr. 794, 798 (Ct. App. 1989)).
The general partnership case quoted in the text of this article, Hellman v. Anderson, came
shortly after Crocker. It analyzed Crocker's partner consent requirement modifying the three
conditions test with an undue interference test as quoted in the text. Hellman, 284 Cal. Rptr. at
837. Professor Hynes strongly disagreed with strengthening the charging orders' prophylactic
effect even for the sake of the partnership and the partnership business (even as opposed to the
upside-down protection which primarily serves to benefit the debtor-partner which is the case in
Olmstead). Hynes, supra note 173, at 13-15.
Professor Hynes also identifies Georgia as the first state to modify its partnership act to ex-
clude foreclosure from the charging order process. Hynes, supra note 173, at 18 (citing Larry E.
Ribstein, An Analysis of Georgia's New Partnership Law, 36 MERCER L. REV. 443 (1985) (Rib-
stein helped draft the Georgia provision)). For the historical and global context for "asset
shielding," see Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the
Firm, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1333, 1388-1394 (2006). Charging orders and attendant auxiliary pro-
ceedings began in equity. See supra note 119. Now such provisions are statutory.
This migration is not completely unique in the law because the law of wills, too, migrated into
statutory law (but from law not from equity). See generally John H. Langbein & Lawrence W.
Waggoner, Curing Execution Errors and Mistaken Terms in Wills 1 (Univ. Mich. Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 207), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1653438. The paper states that "[c]ourts of equity have for centuries exercised the power to
reform mistakes in trusts, deeds of gift, and beneficiary designations." Id. at 6. Only now, how-
ever, have "[leading modern authority in a number of American states ... reversed the strict-
compliance and no-reformation rules [of the interpretation of wills]. Both by judicial decision
and legislation, the courts have been empowered to excuse harmless execution errors and to
reform mistaken terms." Id. at 1. The emphasis on intent, and the expressed confidence that
courts can determine intent even in cases where the person whose intent matters is dead, would
seem to encourage the use of intent elsewhere, like in actual fraud. See supra note 140.
The other reason the relaxation of strict-compliance and no-reformation for wills might be
instructive in the context of charging orders is that some courts have taken the action even
though there was no statutory authority to do so and no change in the statute on which to imply
such a legislative intent. According to Langbein and Waggoner, the Ontario Court of Justice
stated, "'the ... absence of legislation on point should not stop the court from developing the
common law where, in circumstances like this, there has been substantial compliance, given that
the dangers which two witnesses are to guard against does [sic] not exist here [one of the wit-
nesses failed to sign the will]."' Langbein & Waggoner, supra, at 7 (quoting Sisson v. Park St.
Baptist Church (1998), 24 E.T.R. 2d 18, para. 40 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.)). Note that this was law,
not equity. This seems to represent the "cooperative partners" school of statutory construction;
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Hynes argues strongly against the imposition of the standard. He
first states that the standard is vague and further states that "uncer-
tainty comes at a cost.' 74 Beyond uncertainty, however, he argues
against the necessity of the rule because more traditional notions of
the charging order and its foreclosure provide balanced protection for
the partnership and the non-debtor partners. 175 This balance, again
according to Hynes, includes "nonpartner debtor redemption" and
"carefully crafted limitations placed on the nature of the interest
bought at the sale."'1 76 Further, he observes: "The ...protections
loom particularly large when one considers that the charging order
displaces remedies at common law."'1 77
Professors Loewenstein and Hynes indirectly emphasize the impor-
tance of reasoned and measured public policy as embodied and ex-
pressed by public statutes that balance the rights, duties, and liabilities
of constituents of business entities. But, this article also suggested
that the best statutory defense against the uncertainty of court-or-
dered equitable remedies (as well as possible legislative push-back in
the context of a member's judgment-creditor) may be a clearly drafted
provision that provides a limited but arguably adequate remedy at law
as a prophylactic.
ISSUE CASCADE AND A LEGISLATIVE AGENDA
There existed no articulated policy basis for different charging order
formulas between the charging order provisions of the various unin-
corporated Florida acts. Therefore, Olmstead calls out for a legislative
perhaps with just a hint of natural law. See supra notes 74-91 and accompanying text (statutory
construction). It is consistent with the charging order foreclosure cases that resulted in the un-
due interference test in California.
An author of the present article, Geu, echoed earlier warnings, including the one quoted in
the text early in 2005. He feared an explosion of the use of unpredictable equitable remedies
and the increase of more "control-person" or "responsible party" models of statutory liability if
charging order provisions remedies too tightly to provide reasonable recourse in the bad facts
case. Thomas Earl Geu, Letter to the Editor, 19 PROB. & PROP., Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 4. See also
ADKISSON, supra note 90.
174. Hynes, supra note 173, at 13. Hynes qualifies that statement by saying, "[t]hat alone does
not make a rule wrong." Hynes, supra note 173, at 13.
175. Hynes, supra note 173, at 12-17.
176. Hynes, supra note 173, at 13-14. Some state statutes do not allow foreclosure sales of the
transferable interest. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED. L. § 47-34A-504(e)(2010) ("No other remedy,
including foreclosure on a members distributional interest..."). It would be interesting to ask
Professor Hynes whether he would consider such a statute a carefully balanced policy based
statute.
177. Hynes, supra note 173, at 15. If the undue interference standard were applied to Olin-
stead, the first issue might be whether the SMLLCs had a "business" with which to be interfered.
Obviously, the single-member nature of the LLCs in Olmstead makes it possible to distinguish it
from Hellman on the facts.
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response. The relatively simple change of adding the exclusivity lan-
guage to the statute will calm the waves that Olmstead caused.
Even with the additional exclusivity language it would be possible
for Olmstead (or cases like it) to reach the same conclusion. The same
result may be reached by at least two different ways. First, a court
could use different canons of statutory construction to chart a differ-
ent course to the same destination. Second a court could, in many
cases, go straight to equity to supplement the statute. While ade-
quately solving the dispute of the parties at bar, ad hoc judicial re-
sponses do not answer the normative policy question of whether all
charging order provisions should provide the charging order as the
exclusive remedy.
The addition of these few words to the statute probably should ap-
ply equally to all unincorporated entities and to all owners of those
entities (be they an LLC member or manager, a general or limited
partner, or a partner in a limited liability partnership). Moreover, the
addition of the "exclusive" words across all statutes solves the issue in
Olmstead. Such a solution, however, ignores plausible distinguishing
features across and within each entity. The distinguishing characteris-
tic of the LLC that was the gravamen of the certified question in Olm-
stead was the capacity for LLCs to have a single member. 178 Based on
that distinguishing characteristic, a state could legitimately determine
that the charging order should apply differently to multiple member
LLCs and SMLLCs. The charging order, therefore, could be the ex-
clusive remedy in the case of a multiple member LLCs but not the
exclusive remedy in the case of SMLLCs. 179
Similar differences between types of entities might lead to different
treatment for purposes of foreclosure against charged transferable in-
terests;180 or apply differently if the entire membership interest of any
178. But see supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
179. While doing so would no doubt lower a state's ranking as to the vitality of its asset pro-
tection law, a state could decide that a high ranking on that index is not desirable. A state that
has rejected (or not embraced) the self-settled spendthrift trust might decide that the SMLLC
should not be available for asset protection purposes. Cf. infra note 184. There are other arti-
cles discussing legislative responses to Olmstead. See, e.g., Carter G. Bishop, Desiderata: The
Single Member Limited Liability Charging Order Statutory Lacuna, STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN.
(forthcoming 2010) (SUFFOLK UNIV. L. SCH. RESEARCH PAPER No. 10-59), available at http:l/
ssrn.comabstract=1697621.
180. Some have asserted that the ability to foreclose upon the charging order lien is a signifi-
cant weakness in the asset protection provided in even multiple member LLCs. See generally
Elizabeth M. Schurig & Amy P. Jetel, The Alarming Potential for Foreclosure and Dissolution by
an LLC Member's Personal Creditors, 20 PROB. & PROP., May-June 2006, at 42. Others think
any weakness is outweighed by possible benefits. See generally Thomas E. Rutledge, Carter G.
Bishop & Thomas E. Geu, Foreclosure and Dissolution Rights of a Member's Creditors: No
Cause for Alarm, 21 PROB. & PROP., May-June 2007, at 35. For a discussion of the perhaps
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type of entity were freely transferable by agreement.181 Moreover, it
is conceivable that a state might make distinctions between the types
of entities in order to fine-tune specific entity types for particular uses;
for example, the LLC for use in real estate development and syndica-
tion versus the limited partnership for estate and asset protection
planning.
On the other hand, the number of existing entities and the dense
web of interstate commerce provide a good argument that charging
order provisions should be consistent not only across all unincorpo-
rated entity types in a single state, but uniform across the several
states.182 Such uniformity would avoid the very type of interpretive
issue that confronted the Court in Olmstead and would reduce possi-
ble conflicts and unintended consequences concerning multi-state-en-
tity operation. 83 In any event, once the several policy questions are
answered, the answers should be articulated by setting forth particular
and distinguishing language against the backdrop of a basic formula
used by all the unincorporated entities in order to make as clear as
possible the intent of the legislature. 184
In summary, states need to consider carefully, under a range of fac-
tual permutations, the range of interrelationships under their remedy
statutes vis-A-vis the charging order. For example, an express determi-
nation that the charging order is the exclusive remedy, post-Olmstead,
might contain language like "including against an interest in an LLC
with a single member" if that is the intent. Of course, a state can
make the opposite policy decision, meaning that asset partitioning
through use of an SMLLC185 against a judgment-creditor of a member
will not be permitted. 86 But that decision too should be reflected in
the statutory language. Statutory language is particularly important as
a mechanism of bringing clarity and certainty to the law in states with
unintended consequences of precluding foreclosure, see Jacob Stein, Building Stumbling Blocks:
A Practical Take on Charging Orders, 8 Bus. ENTITIES, Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 28.
181. Where the parties themselves have given a partner/member the authority to freely trans-
fer the interest (consider the example of the publicly traded master limited partnership), there
seems to be a significant policy question as to whether the judgment-creditor should be restricted
to the rights afforded the holder of a charging order.
182. See CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 36 § 1:5.
183. See CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 36 (briefly discussing choice of law issues).
184. Such effort for example was recently completed in Kentucky when the five charging or-
der provisions were all revised as necessary to set forth a consistent formula. See 2010 Ky. Acrs
1885, 1895, 1896, 1900, 1904 (amending Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.260,362.285,362.481,362.1-
504, 362.2-703 (West 2010)). Charging order provisions are also a topic of discussion by The
Harmonization of Business Organizations Drafting Committee of the Uniform Law
Commission.
185. See generally Stout, supra note 64; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 64.
186. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 57, 58(2) (2003).
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absence of legislative histories or "weak" reliance upon legislative
history.
And finally: states should consider whether exclusivity extends to
equitable remedies in aid of their statutory collection process and
whether it extends to separate and traditional equitable causes of ac-
tion whether or not codified. The latter, obviously, implicates the eq-
uity power of the courts under the constitutions of the various states.
CONCLUSION
Olmstead is an important decision not so much for what it holds, but
for the instruction provided by the holding. Initially, it is a call for an
informed policy decision concerning negative asset partitioning
through the use of an SMLLC. Perhaps more broadly, it asks whether
the LLC charging order provision should be the "the exclusive rem-
edy by which a person seeking to enforce a judgment against a mem-
ber or transferee may, in the capacity of judgment creditor, satisfy the
judgment from the judgment debtor's transferable interest. 1 87 It is a
clarion call to state drafting committees to undertake a review and
reconciliation of statutory language in order to avoid the pregnant af-
firmative between charging order provisions in separate unincorpo-
rated entity statutes upon which Olmstead relied. After there has
been a policy determination, the specific source of the narrow SMLLC
issue presented in Olmstead can be statutorily solved by making the
charging order provisions consistent across all entities or more clearly
stating any intended distinctions between the provisions.
Unfortunately, the narrow statutory construction issue under which
Olmstead was decided is the only issue that can be re-charted and
avoided with a modicum of certainty. The policy and jurisprudence
concerning the application and construction of the exclusiveness of the
charging order remedy are the harder issues, and their answers are
shaped by jurisprudence that is just beneath the surface of the statute.
The review of the charging order provision, once undertaken, can
likely avoid all but glancing blows to the most fundamental issues,
even assuming they exist just beneath the surface. Even so, any such
review will meet difficult comparative policy issues between different
unincorporated entity statutes in a single state. It will also risk unin-
tended consequences including, inter alia, conflict of law issues if
many states choose different charging order policies for the same type
of entity.
187. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. Acr § 503(g), 6B U.L.A. 498-501 (2008).
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Moreover, and paradoxically, it is possible that increasing the re-
strictiveness of charging order remedies may have the unintended
consequence of narrowing their coverage and increasing uncertainty
as the statute provides an adequate remedy at law in fewer and fewer
cases. Thus, the greater the restrictions, the bigger the invitation to
the courts to exercise their equity jurisdiction, or to use different ca-
nons of statutory construction to avoid unacceptable results. In addi-
tion, greater restrictions might encourage interest groups and the
legislature to push back against the provisions, thereby actually reduc-
ing the protection afforded by the current statutory charging order.
The push-back could ultimately place a venture's operational assets at
such risk to the creditors of individual members that the choice for
refuge from liability could shift back to the corporation.
No matter the policies chosen, however, the lessons from Olmstead
include: (1) it is necessary to consider factual permutations when mak-
ing policy decisions about charging orders; (2) there is a premium on
clear and consistent statutory drafting; and, (3) there will remain a
modicum of jurisprudential tension caused by judicial construction of
statutes because that tension reflects the constitutional design of sepa-
ration of powers. In those general matters, Olmstead is unremarkable.
2010]
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